

# 15 “You don’t own peace”

## The coward state, South Sudan, and IGAD relations

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### **Introduction**

On 15 December 2013, South Sudan descended into bitter political violence and chaos, emanating from the disputes within the leadership of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) over political power and wealth. According to Amnesty International, the violence led to the deaths of over 100,000 people, particularly in the Juba, Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Unity states. Many pundits and political analysts have pointed to the root cause of violence as a power struggle within the SPLM family. However, the government line is that the political violence was triggered by a failed coup d’état led by Vice President Riek Machar and his apologists, thirsty for power and prestige. However, the government anecdote of a foiled coup has been highly discredited by the international community and the 2013 African Union (AU) Commission of Inquiry Report.

As the result of the civil strife, a delegation representing the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Council of Ministers flew to the capital of South Sudan, Juba, on 19 December 2013, for an emergency three-day visit in order to get a first-hand impression of the political crisis and violence that had rocked the country since the night of 15 December. The move led to a subsequent meeting of the IGAD Heads of State and Government in Nairobi, Kenya, on 27 December, culminating in the establishment of IGAD’s peace mediation. Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin of Ethiopia, Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo of Kenya, and Ambassador Gen. Mohammed Ahmed El-Dabi of Sudan were nominated as IGAD envoys.

Given the complex and tiring mediation process, having missed a 5 March 2015 deadline, the IGAD Heads of State and Government consented to the expansion of IGAD to IGAD-Plus to include the AU Commission, China, the European Union, Norway, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), and the United Nations (UN). With regional and international pressures, IGAD-Plus convinced the conflicting parties to sign the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCISS) on 17 and 26 August 2015, respectively. However, the implementation of the ARCISS has sharply exposed the working relations between the Transitional Government of South Sudan and IGAD. While many political scientists and peace scholars have been examining

the role of IGAD in South Sudan's peace mediation and the challenges bedeviling the organisation, none of the scholars has studied the relationship between IGAD and the government of South Sudan (GRSS). This chapter aims to fill this gap in knowledge.

The chapter argues that South Sudan is a "coward state" in its relations with IGAD. In expounding this central argument, the chapter is organised as follows: section one explores and explains the concept of the "coward state" and advances neoliberal peace theory in analysing the relations of South Sudan with IGAD; section two examines the friendly and unfriendly relations between IGAD and South Sudan. In explaining this, the chapter unpacks the delicate and intractable links between IGAD and its member states. In doing so, it discusses the Ugandan military intervention at the behest of the Kiir faction in the conflicts in December 2013 and its impact on South Sudan–IGAD relations. Section three tackles the suspicious and ambiguous relations between IGAD and South Sudan in implementing the ARCISS. Section four analyses the roles played by Ethiopia, Sudan, and Kenya in South Sudan's efforts directed towards resolving the political crisis. Section five concludes by pointing to areas for further research and offering policy recommendations for managing South Sudan–IGAD relations.

### **South Sudan, the coward state**

The concept of a coward state concept is derived from Murphy's (2011) seminal proposition of a "courageous state." He argues that to have a courageous state, a coward state must also exist. Murphy notes that a coward state is one that forces poor citizens who have never been part of an economic or political crisis to pay for it while the rich and powerful who created it from within benefit from the mess (Murphy, 2011, 4). While this state squeezes out the poor, it does not grant a future to the next generation. This is a state that is failing its young population by putting them in crisis by not securing their education and socio-economic wellbeing, which could enhance their prosperity (Murphy, 2011, 5). Richard Murphy continues to lament that a coward state does not have the courage to provide its young people with jobs, its old people with secure care, its population with protection against unemployment and unforeseen events, or its children with decent schools (Murphy, 2011, 5). A coward state is a state that instigates chaos and violence and fails to bring order, security, and tranquillity. In essence, a coward state roars loudly and fails to take important diplomatic, political, and economic steps, particularly towards building peace.

As Murphy argues, South Sudan perfectly fits the prescription of a coward state. It is a state that loudly announces its plans but fails to provide services to its citizens including public security. To unpack the complexities of failed coward states, Kraxberger (2012) characterises them under two main categories: effectiveness and legitimacy of political institutions. By "effectiveness," Kraxberger refers to the degree to which governments fulfil minimal expectations for delivering public goods and services; "legitimacy of political institutions" addresses the amount of respect that citizens of a state have for state institutions (Kraxberger,

2012, 1). Fulfilment of minimal expectations and legitimacy depend on physical security, which is a core problem for fragile coward states. Failed coward states are extremely violent places, though violence can come in different forms. Rebels or warlords may control large chunks of territory or engage in fighting with government forces; and government security personnel may prey upon ordinary citizens, whether due to greed, organised repression, or poor training (Kraxberger, 2012, 1).

Also, failed coward states do not have functioning social services. Kraxberger argues that these states provide little in the field of education, for instance. Educational systems suffer from quantitative and qualitative deficiencies (Kraxberger, 2012, 1). Staff are not paid and are routinely absent from their posts; school buildings are in varying states of neglect or are often abandoned; school fees serve as an accessibility barrier and may be squandered once collected; and those students who do attend school often receive only a rudimentary primary education, with few learning resources (Kraxberger, 2012, 1).

Apart from deficiencies in the areas of education, health, and economic and environmental degradation, as well as the failure of public security, South Sudan has exhibited cowardice in its relationship with IGAD. After signing the ARCISS, the GRSS argued for a list of reservations in the peace text. These reservations have been used to either reject or delay the implementation of the ARCISS. The outcome has been the suspicion of IGAD and IGAD-Plus, which are blamed for allegedly championing regime change in the nascent state. This attitude shows that South Sudan is a coward state. It is a state that shouted about providing services to the citizens, voluntarily signed the ARCISS, and blamed its failure on IGAD and IGAD-Plus member states. It is a state that proclaims its responsibility and runs away from it (Murphy, 2011, 6).

Liberal peacebuilding associates state security and peace with democratic development and institutions, the rule of law, human rights, and a market economy, which are usually undertaken or established by international organisations or actors, mainly the UN and/or others (Franks and Richmond, 2008). The idea is that if these post-conflict states manage to successfully develop and maintain a functional democracy – at least to a certain extent – they will then become part of the greater family of interdependent democracies around the world, and thus have more chances for peace, security, and economic growth, and fewer chances for instability and underdevelopment. Therefore, the theory goes, this model works not only as a peace builder but also as a conflict preventer (Ramsbotham et al., 2010, 116).

In the context of South Sudan–IGAD relations, neoliberal peace theory helps in analysing the GRSS's conundrum in the implementation of the ARCISS. Although rule of law, equality, institutionalism, economic development, and, above all, democracy should have existed for South Sudan to realise meaningful peace, the GRSS has eschewed providing these ingredients and in lieu developed a tendency towards cowardice that has hampered relations with IGAD. Thus, the undoing of South Sudan's peace deal is the suspicion in the country's relations with IGAD, which is what has instilled a sense of cowardly behaviour of the nascent state.

The neoliberal approach has not successfully helped in advancing sustainable peace in the Greater Horn of Africa. Other alternative approaches, such as traditional peace initiatives and conflict resolution mechanisms, have been advanced and South Sudan has benefited from these efforts so far. The stitching together of a social fabric between the Nuer and Dinka peoples after the 1991 SPLM split was addressed through the Wunlit Peace Accord of 1999. This accord was mostly mediated and negotiated by traditional leaders and the clergy. It is probable that Dinka and Nuer ethnic feuds would require traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and not the neoliberal approach.

### **Outbreak of violence and early efforts at peace-making**

The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) was established in 1986, with a focus on drought and desertification; and relaunched in 1996 as IGAD, with an expanded mandate that included conflict resolution (Adar, 2000, 43). It comprises Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, South Sudan, and Eritrea, although Eritrea is currently suspended. The decision to revitalise IGAD was made by the IGAD Heads of State and Government at a meeting held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 18 April 1995. At the 12th Ordinary Summit in 2008, the Heads of State and Government again expanded IGAD's mandate to include regional economic integration (Medhane, 2004, 121). The expansion of the mandate was due in part to IGAD member states' long history of cooperation and conflict with one another. IGAD's involvement in conflict resolution has historically focused on the north–south conflict in Sudan – and now the south–south conflict – and various conflicts in Somalia (Healy, 2011, 54). An IGAD peace process to resolve Sudan's long-running second civil war (1983–2005) was launched in the early 1990s and gained traction in the late 1990s when Kenya held the IGAD chair. IGAD's mediation, led by Gen. Sumbeiywo, received significant support from the "Troika" (the US, the UK, and Norway), particularly at the end of the process. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005 and paved the way for South Sudan's independence in 2011.

In December 2013 when violence broke out in South Sudan, IGAD responded quickly and its first-hand reading of the situation culminated in the establishment of South Sudan's IGAD peace mediation. The complex and tiring mediation process and unsuccessful negotiations made the IGAD Heads of State and Government consent to expanding IGAD to IGAD-Plus to include the AU Commission, China, the EU, Norway, the UK, the US, the UN, and the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF).<sup>1</sup> With regional and international pressures, IGAD-Plus reined in the warring parties to sign the ARCISS. Thus, the former vice president, Riek Machar and President Salva Kiir eventually signed the peace agreement on 17 and 26 August 2015, respectively. Yet, South Sudan relations with IGAD have been a bitter-sweet puzzle, as the former views the latter as a friend, enemy, and suspicious agent of regime change. Given the South Sudanese government's mixed view of IGAD, relations between the two bodies have been defined by cowardice.

Before 2013, the GRSS had regarded IGAD as a buddy and a caring organisation. However, the events of 15 December 2013 and the overwhelming of

government troops by the rebels, the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), which made the GRSS call in the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF), significantly changed the context of GRSS–IGAD relations. President Salva Kiir later admitted to Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni that "Uganda is a friend indeed and that without your intervention, my government would have gone, and I sincerely thank you for this."<sup>2</sup>

### **Uganda's role as interested party**

As violence intensified in South Sudan, Museveni sent troops to support Kiir. Uganda has remained a staunch ally and has often sought to benefit financially and politically from foreign military activities. Therefore, its deployment of soldiers to South Sudan should be seen in the same context (Schomerus, 2012, 114). Uganda's intervention, which appeared initially as a one-off event with the dispatch of a company of UPDF soldiers to South Sudan to secure the evacuation of Ugandan citizens from the country (Kasaija, 2014, 1), turned out to be detailed and comprehensive and involved securing critical infrastructures, protecting Ugandan nationals (Clotney, 2014), and fighting the rebels in and around Bor, the capital of Jonglei. Controversial methods were used, including aerial bombardment involving the use of cluster bombs. The UPDF fought alongside the government army, the SPLA, but Uganda's intervention was associated with attempted rebel advances from South Bor towards Juba city. Also, the UPDF provided the GRSS with advisers and logistical support. Its main base was near Juba airport, but soldiers were also stationed in Bor and Nisitu to guard vital installations, including the main trade route to Uganda, the Juba–Nimule highway (Sudan Tribune, 2014). However, as the conflict escalated, Ugandan troops were increased to an estimated level of between 2,000 and 5,000 soldiers.

Uganda's link to the conflict in South Sudan has made Kampala a belligerent party who is more focused on securing its interests in-country than on the Addis Ababa peace talks (Crisis Group, 2015). It therefore had no representative among the special envoys (from Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan) appointed by the IGAD Council of Ministers in December 2013. Uganda is seen by many as the king-maker in Juba (Vlassenroot et al., 2012, 236). However, political indecisiveness, displeasure with the options on the table, and relative acceptance of the status quo meant that Uganda's military influence did not translate into the regional political leadership needed to end a conflict that could not be won on the battlefield (Crisis Group, 2015). Uganda's posture is shaped by deep animosity towards Sudan and visceral dislike of former South Sudan vice president and head of the SPLM/A-IO, Dr Riek Machar. At the same time, officials would often disparage Kiir's government. While the intervention was an endeavour of military friendship, it involved a lot of economic interests, as the GRSS is alleged to have paid USD \$800 million to the government of Uganda for the intervention package.

The UPDF's involvement in South Sudan's bloody civil war raises enormous questions over whether it was a legitimate undertaking or driven by other parochial interests. The Ugandan government argues that it intervened to secure vital

installations to rescue its nationals, who were trapped in the conflict. However, the same Uganda government argues it was invited by the GRSS to intervene, with authorisation from IGAD. The claim that the actions were taken to "rescue trapped Ugandans" (Kasaija, 2014, 7) was popular in Uganda especially in the official circles (Mugerwa and Nalugo, 2014; Walusimbi, 2014).

There is no basis in existing international protocol or treaty that authorises a foreign country to just send troops to another country to rescue its nationals. The UN Charter provides some leeway for military intervention to be done by members of the UN after it has been sanctioned by the UN Security Council. In the case of South Sudan, Uganda's intervention seems to have gone beyond rescuing Ugandans caught up in the fighting. The announcement that the UPDF was fighting alongside GRSS forces against the rebel troops supporting Machar clearly violates the requirement of proportionality, which demands that action taken must not be excessive. The UPDF fighting on behalf of one of the factions in the conflict points to an abuse of this state practice, as there exists no right of states to rescue their nationals caught up in conflicts mainly because such a right is subject to abuse.

A democratically elected government such as South Sudan's has the legitimate authority to carry out state functions, including inviting another country's forces to come to its aid if its legitimacy is challenged (Kasaija, 2014, 6). However, in such a situation the agreement to be of any legal effect must be clearly established; really expressed (which precludes merely presumed consent); internationally attributable to the state; and anterior to the commission of the act to which it refers (United Nations, 1999, para. 234). In the case of South Sudan, the GRSS had been democratically elected and is the only legitimate government. Wherever the incumbent government controls the political apparatus of the state, it may request external assistance or even military intervention to assist it in maintaining control of the state (Wippman, 1996, 228). Shaw (2003, 23) has observed: "It would appear that in general, aid to the government authorities to repress a revolt is perfectly legitimate, provided of course it was requested by the government." The example of France's intervention in Mali in 2013, upon the invitation of the interim transitional government of Mali, to halt the advance of the Islamic jihadists who were threatening to take over the capital Bamako came in handy (Bannelier and Christakis, 2013, 856; Coco, Kaboré, and Maillart, 2013, 91).

The UN General Assembly Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the UN states that "No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State" (United Nations General Assembly, 1970, 123). This would presuppose that a state's intervention in a civil war in another state is prohibited. However, while there exists the suggestion that intervention in a civil war on the side of the government at its request is unlawful, there is little support for this in practice (Chatham House, 2007).<sup>3</sup> However, under the 1975 Wiesbaden Resolution on the Principle of Non-Intervention in Civil Wars (1975) of the Institute of International Law (IDI), which is non-binding, Uganda's intervention in South Sudan was

illegal, as the resolution, in particular, prohibits third-party states from assisting parties to a civil war, such as “sending armed forces [...] to any party to a civil war, or allowing them to be sent or to set out.” However, in practice, it only seems to prohibit intervention on the side of those opposing the government. Since Uganda intervened on the side of the GRSS, its intervention was viewed as legal.

The debate about the justification for the intervention of Ugandan troops in South Sudan continues. There are claims and counterclaims about the purported letter from Kiir to Museveni requesting the intervention (Arinaitwe, 2014; Tajuba, 2014). Also, there has been a reference to the military pact signed by GRSS Uganda, which came after the UPDF had already started fighting in South Sudan alongside the troops of President Salva Kiir. However, the interesting twist is the claim by the Ugandan government officials that the invitation was with IGAD’s approval, and consent of the member states of IGAD (Mukisa, 2014, 5). Closely related is the claim that Uganda’s intervention in South Sudan was justified under the IGAD Peace and Security Mechanism (Musisi, 2014, 8). Arguably, IGAD commended Uganda’s intervention only to help secure critical infrastructure and installations but did not authorise it to intervene in the bloody conflict. The wording of IGAD’s 27 December 2013 communiqué does not suggest that the organisation intended to support Uganda’s intervention in South Sudan beyond what was stated (Kasaija, 2014, 10). It is a requirement of international law that agreements between states should be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of a treaty (United Nations, 1969). If IGAD had intended to support Uganda’s efforts beyond those stated in the communiqué, it should have stated so (Kasaija, 2014, 10).

### **Roles of IGAD and IGAD-Plus**

South Sudan is the eighth member of the regional organisation. But the GRSS views IGAD as an enemy that is working for regime change in the nascent state. The expansion of the IGAD mediation initiative to the US, the UK, and Norway, known as the “Troika,” further complicated the relationship between the GRSS and IGAD. The GRSS views Western countries as yearning for regime change in the young nation. This view has been held for a very long time by the GRSS. Although the GRSS signed the peace deal on 26 August 2015, ending nearly three years of protracted war, it immediately backed out arguing that it had not signed the agreement willingly and in good faith which led to the continuation of the conflict. The president’s statement after signing the deal points to the existence of 22 reservations in the text that were to be attached to the agreement as an addendum. However, the US rightly rejected all the reservations after signing. Susan Rice, then the US national security adviser, was reported as saying “we do not recognize any reservations or addendums to that agreement” (Guardian, 2015).

With its rejection of the reservations to the peace agreement, the GRSS singled out the US as championing regime change. This allegation has led to worsening relations between the two countries and many ugly incidents have taken place at the US Embassy. In May 2016 “unknown gunmen” attacked the embassy

residence, killing the longest-serving security guard. On 7 July, a group of SPLA soldiers shot at a US diplomatic car, which was carrying seven diplomats, in the capital Juba. Luckily, the diplomats survived because the car was armoured and bulletproof (Radio Tamazuj, 2016).

The GRSS views Western nations as advocates of regime change in South Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 2016; Alfonse, 2016). The regime change phobia is dominantly present in the GRSS's perception of IGAD's role. For example, the IGAD Council of Ministers met in Nairobi on 11 July at the 56th extraordinary session on South Sudan, and demanded, among other things, the re-opening of Juba International Airport to be protected by regional forces. It also asked for urgent revision of the UNMISS mandate to establish an intervention brigade and increase numbers of troops from the region to secure Juba (Intergovernmental Authority on Development, 2016). This resolution sent a wave of protests against placing South Sudan under trusteeship to the GRSS, leading Kiir to sack the deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr Cirino Hiteng, arguing that he failed to reject IGAD's demands. Hiteng was nominated as deputy minister on an SPLM Former Political Detainees (FPDs) ticket, in accordance with the ARCISS power-sharing formula. His sacking by Kiir contradicted the peace deal. But it is imperative to note that Kiir's swift action was influenced by the thinking that IGAD was slowly taking over South Sudan to manage it as a trustee. Kiir revealed this in an interview with Al Jazeera on 12 July 2016. "I am just like a child being ordered by everybody" (Ndushabandi, 2016), he said, referring to IGAD's strongly worded communiqué. Furthermore, Kiir expressed fears and frustrations on the survivability of the peace agreement after the July 2016 skirmishes (Ndushabandi, 2016).

However, the IGAD Heads of State and Government meeting in Kigali, Rwanda, resolved to send regional troops to South Sudan to help protect civilians and vital installations. This final resolution of IGAD Heads of State and Government reiterated what the 56th extraordinary session of Council of Ministers had said. Nonetheless, the GRSS argued that it had been let down by IGAD and felt isolated as a member state.<sup>4</sup> Makuei accused IGAD member states of supporting military intervention in South Sudan. He argued that IGAD had been supporting Machar, with whom they were in daily contact. Makuei warned that South Sudan was also capable of supporting proxy rebellions in IGAD member states and of causing havoc. Above all, he indicated that all IGAD member states had their problems and their own rebels, not just South Sudan (Wol, 2016).

### **Role(s) of regional actors**

Ethiopia is an important player in regional politics, has military power, and can be a stabilising and potentially destabilising factor. The country has long-standing ties with the SPLM but also links through shared border communities (e.g. the Nuer–Nuer relationship in the Gambella region) and hosts South Sudanese refugees. Not only did Ethiopia host the negotiations on the South Sudan political crisis and ensure the ARCISS was signed, it remains a key player, given its hegemonic drive, including being chair of IGAD, a position it has held since 2006.



In the same vein, it chairs the IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism and the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). Ambassador Mesfin, the chair of the three special envoys, is an Ethiopian and Tedros Adanhom, the country's foreign minister, was on the IGAD fact-finding mission that visited Juba immediately after the outbreak of violence in 2013. Ethiopia hosted Machar but backed away from hosting him after the July 2016 political violence. Ethiopia is a major troop-contributing country in peacekeeping missions for Sudan and South Sudan, UNISFA, and the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). Ethiopia is also the leader of the Regional Protection Force that was sanctioned by UNSC Resolution Number 2304 to stabilise South Sudan.

Ethiopia has economic, security, and strategic interests in South Sudan that relate partly to power generation from a dam 40 km from the border and an oil refinery that should supply Ethiopia with refined fuels from Pagak in South Sudan. There are also other projects such as the construction of the Gambella–Pagak–Paloch road to connect the two countries, in particular, to ferry fuels to Ethiopia. Whether these projects will be viable or not it will depend on the resources the two countries commit. Moreover, the nexus between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the question of Islamic extremists infiltrating the region, will remain of interest not only to Ethiopia but also to IGAD and Western countries, and Ethiopia will be a key player in the fight against terror.

However, Ethiopia must deal with the growing perception that it supports Machar's rebellion and should make sure that resolution of South Sudanese political impasse is not only seen as an Ethiopia-led initiative but an IGAD-Plus one by encouraging consensus among the parties through reassuring statements. Ethiopians have numerous investments in South Sudan, particularly in the hospitality sector. However, Ethiopia would be acting in South Sudan's interests – and particularly the GRSS's broad interests – when it supports the Ethiopian stand on the Grand Renaissance Dam. This is a long-running standoff in hydro-politics between Egypt and Ethiopia.

Sudan is regarded as the “mother” of all the problems relating to the independence of South Sudan. It has been alleged that since its independence, Sudan has endeavoured to ensure South Sudan has been in a state of perpetual instability to demonstrate that it cannot govern itself. Following the outbreak of violence in South Sudan, the Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir, visited Juba in what analysts described as a ritual act rather than one of substance. With vast knowledge of the country, Sudan has the potential to play both positive and negative role(s).

Sudan has expertise and military resilience, but also great economic interest related to the flow of oil, because it hosts oil infrastructure. The Abyei issue is one of the outstanding post-referendum issues. The country has genuine political and security interests that relate to the un-demarcated border and proxy wars involving various armed opposition groups in both South Sudan and Sudan.

Sudan's role is of course contingent on links between and among political groupings of the National Congress Party, SPLA, SPLM, M23, and the Sudanese Revolutionary Force – the opposition force in Sudan. In short, Sudan has

unfinished business with South Sudan, emanating from the CPA and, ironically, it now hosts numerous South Sudanese refugees.

Sudan has played a critical role in conflict resolution in South Sudan. Gen. El-Dabi, the retired Sudanese diplomat-cum-military officer, is serving as a third special envoy in IGAD's mediation initiative. On several occasions, South Sudan officials have called for the expulsion of Khartoum's representatives from peace talks, claiming that South Sudanese rebels are being trained, armed, and controlled by Sudan.<sup>5</sup>

Kenya has political, security, economic, and cultural interests and historical links with South Sudan and the whole push for a regional integration process in the sub-region. The country remains important, having hosted the CPA process; but, also, the first IGAD summit on the crisis was held at the country's state house on 27 December 2013. Apart from Gen. Sumbeiywo, the country has a special envoy to South Sudan, Dalmas Otieno. The former minister was among the first international delegation that called on Juba when the conflict broke out on 15 December. The country is also the IGAD rapporteur.

Kenya is a troop-contributing country to UNMISS. About 1,000 Kenyan soldiers serve in the mission, deployed in Bhar el Ghazal in South Sudan. Kenya is willing to contribute more soldiers for the mission. Kenya not only has a regional integration, economic, trade, and business agenda in Juba, including the Lamu Port–South Sudan–Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor Project, but also Kenya's President Uhuru Kenyatta wishes to portray himself as a regional powerbroker. Kenyatta was not only instrumental in the release of 11 political detainees, but he was also ready to receive and host them at the state house upon their release. At present, some of the FPDs are hosted in Kenya, in addition to hosting numerous South Sudanese refugees. Several high-ranking officials in South Sudan not only have their families living in Nairobi but also businesses located in the city. South Sudanese elites also patronise health facilities in Nairobi. Furthermore, there are a lot of South Sudanese in Kenya's institutions of higher learning, including refugees, in addition to having cultural links through shared border communities.

## **Conclusion**

Relations between the GRSS and IGAD have been characterised by cowardly action on the part of the former. Relations have been characterised by blame, tension, and suspicion. South Sudan's behaviour is one of a coward state. It agreed to sign a peace agreement and immediately backtracked, pointing the finger at the international community for pressuring its president into signing. South Sudan's relations with IGAD are rather ambivalent, friendly but characterised by suspicion and tension. According to the GRSS, IGAD is a friend indeed because of Uganda's intervention in South Sudan's conflicts, with soldiers fighting alongside Kiir in December 2013. However, the GRSS views the same relationship with suspicion, given perceptions that IGAD-Plus is allegedly seeking regime change in South Sudan. Moreover, regional powers such

as Ethiopia, Sudan, and Kenya have their own varied interests in the South Sudanese political debacle.

With South Sudan being far from an ideal neoliberal peace implementation case, relations between South Sudan and IGAD could get worse. The best way to improve working relations between South Sudan and IGAD is for South Sudan to develop trust mechanisms and build confidence within itself to relate on a sincere basis with both IGAD and IGAD-Plus. Given that IGAD or IGAD-Plus mediate in South Sudan's conflicts, the GRSS should avoid its cowardly perspective to their relationship and implement the provisions of ARCISS to the letter and spirit. At the same time, IGAD or IGAD-Plus should close loopholes where the GRSS views it as not impartial. For instance, the intervention of UPDF soldiers during the political crisis of 15 December, with the blessings of the IGAD Heads of State and Government, brought into question the credibility and impartiality of the IGAD member states. Although this seems to be a positive achievement for the GRSS, the intervention is seriously detested by South Sudanese people. The chapter hereby recommends further research to exhaustively document and analyse the relationship between the GRSS and the Troika countries in the voyage of implementing the August 2015 peace agreement.

## Notes

- 1 The IPF largely comprises IGAD's donor partners and has three levels of membership: ministerial, ambassadorial, and technical. The IPF is currently co-chaired by the Italian government and comprises the following members: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, the US, the European Commission, the International Organization for Migration, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the World Bank.
- 2 Kiir's Speech during the third anniversary of independence, 9 July 2014, at Dr John Garang's Mausoleum.
- 3 The full text of the non-intervention resolution can be found at [http://www.idi iil.org/id iE/resolutionsE/1975\\_wies\\_03\\_en.pdf](http://www.idi iil.org/id iE/resolutionsE/1975_wies_03_en.pdf).
- 4 Senior Presidential Advisor, Nhial Deng Nhial's press statement after Kigali's meeting.
- 5 South Sudan's Deputy Ambassador to Kenya James P. Morgan claimed in an interview with the Kenyan newspaper *Daily Nation* [What is the full reference for this?] that South Sudanese rebels were being trained, armed, and controlled by Khartoum. The diplomat also called for its [What does its refer to?] expulsion from the IGAD mediation team.

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