

Research Article

The Role of the United Nations in South Sudanese State Building and Failure

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Abstract

The study robustly examines the role of the United Nations in South Sudanese state-building and failure. In South Sudanese state building, the United Nations family of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) have been viewed to have built South Sudanese state through support to peace building and mediations, support to the states programmes and national programmes such as Governors forums and reconstruction activities of South Sudanese state. However, UNDP and UNMISS have failed South Sudanese state through associated regime change agenda. UNDP capacity sucking out in-lieu of capacity building demonstrated the UN desire to fail South Sudanese state. UNMISS's biased role during 2013 political conflicts is seen as state failure strategy. This was revealed in 2014 when the UN marked Container Truck carrying goods to Bentiu was impounded by the SPLA and later found to be carrying ammunition. UNMISS failure to protect civilians during 2013 and 2016 conflicts was viewed as an act of state failure of South Sudan. On methodology, the study used primary and secondary sources in understanding the role played by UN in South Sudanese state-building and failure. Primary data include the use of questionnaires and interviews in tapping the understanding of the role played by UNDP and UNMISS in state building and failure of South Sudan. Secondary sources include the use of empirical literature review in deeply understanding the UN's hand in South Sudanese state-building and failure. The study used a sample size of 200 respondents with sample types of persuasive and cluster sampling combined. The study also combines process tracing and case study methods to contextualize and validate causal chains and empirical casual processes of the UN role in South Sudanese state-building and failure. The results of the study indicate that the United Nations and particularly, the UNMISS negligently contributed to South Sudanese state failure than building through its strategy to stay neutral and above all, its failure to protect civilians in the 2013 and 2016 political conflicts. Finally, the study concludes on the need of South Sudanese Government to take its constitutional role in providing development services and protect its citizens in the eventuality of political violence and civil war in South Sudan. The study recommends future research on how the UN family (UNDP and UNMISS) and Government of South Sudan can improve their working relationships for sustainable state building and prosperity of South Sudanese citizens.

Keywords

State Building, State Failure, State Collapse, UNDP, UNMISS, Capacity Building, Capacity Sucking out, Programmes Duplication

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1. Introduction

United Nations (UN) agencies have played critical role in South Sudan state building and failure. South Sudan is the only country in the world history where UN General Assembly President and Secretary General attended the independence celebrations of South Sudan in their physical capacities on 9th July 2011 [5]. The United Nations had lofty ideas of building South Sudanese state to prosperity. Although it attempted, it has at the same time contributed to its failure. This study shall be restricted to the UNDP and UNMISS to discern their roles in South Sudan state-building and failure.

Participation in a state failure in a region by great powers, international and regional organizations have similar effects on structures and dynamics of interaction within the units at the regional levels [27]. Strategic interests of outside powers may bolster the capacity of individual states to cope with threats, at the expense of their challengers. While this may increase the chances of this particular state to escape the prospect of state failure, such external intervention potentially gives rise to a phenomenon described as conflict displacement and state failure [20]. Most African countries that have experienced external interventions have either succeeded or failed. The interventions have been tweaked on support for state-building, reconstruction and transition to democracy but the outcome at some points has been support to state failure. In 2005 and 2011, the UN undertook two multilateral military interventions respectively known as the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) on tandem of civilians protection, peace building and consolidation, and political stabilization. Yet, the outcome has been different in the two Sudans with state failure for the twin states.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Definition of State Building, Failure and Collapse

According to Jacob Riak, state building refers to consolidation of state programmes and institutions [22]. It is an intentional drive to develop the capacity of the institutions and legitimacy of the state in relation to an effective political dialogue for negotiating the mutual demands between the state and societal groups [18]. On the other hand, state building focuses on economic development, up scaling the capacity of human resources, establishing an effective security apparatus, being responsible for fiscal policy, efficient service delivery and providing general infrastructure [13]. It entails policies aimed at encouraging the growth of private sector, including foreign direct investment. Francis Fukuyama further defines state-building as the creation of new government institutions and the strengthening of the existing ones [9]. In other words, Fukuyama sees the state-building as an institu-

tional process that promotes institutional capacity building and progresses in a polity. In nutshell, state-building is fundamentally seen as a theoretical edifice conceptualized by its endogenous and exogenous conceptions [22].

Moreover, state failure is the inability of the state to provide services to its citizens. State failure is a long-term and multidimensional process whereby state collapse is the distinctive endpoint of state failure [1]. Thus, states fail when they are consumed by internal violence and cease delivering positive political goods to their inhabitants [23]. Two dimensions to state failure can be identified as the loss of legitimacy which is the gradual attenuation of the authority of the state due to refusal of dissatisfied citizens to obey the state on the grounds of their perceptions that the state is incapable or repressive or both and loss of efficiency-the increasing malfunctioning of the institutions of the state [which may be due to lack of resources or debt burden] which makes the government irrelevant to the citizens. Indeed, state failure and state collapse have been victims of conceptual ambiguity of our times as these terms were used interchangeably [29].

Rotberg's observation is similar to that of Ajude and sees state collapse as the endpoint of a state failure process of institutional and functional decay, which commences with state vulnerability and progresses through stages of weakness, failing and failure before reaching the stage of collapse. A collapse state exhibits a vacuum of authority; it is a mere geographical expression; a black hole into which failed polity loss its central authority. William Zartman reinforces this view and considers state collapse from the perspective of the inability of state to fulfill its functions, which he sum-ups as the sovereign authority, decision-making institution, and security guarantee for a populated territory [29]. Zartman came to a similar conception to Rotberg's in which he argues state collapse as "a situation whereby the structures, authority [legitimate power], laws and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstructed in some form, be it a new or an old world order" [1].

The role of the International and development community, particularly, the United Nations, has received copious of empirical literature in the scholarly arguments. Critical analyses have been paraded to discern how development community has either built or failed post-conflict states. The journey of South Sudan state-building and consolidation has been a multifaceted endeavor involving all the stakeholders. South Sudan in September 2011 ratified the United Nations Charter and became 193rd member, received applauds for joining International Government. Many UN agencies have been supporting the people of South Sudan before the signing of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), during the interim period, towards the independence and post-independence South Sudan. These supports have been spelt out in various mandates UN agencies are executing in South Sudan. For instance, UNDP mandate has been building

strong accountable institutions of the governance, rule of law and service delivery while UNMISS initial mandate ranges from protection of civilians, human rights monitoring & reporting and support for the establishment and extension of accountable state authority. At the time of this research, the UNMISS mandate has been restricted to protection of civilians, human rights monitoring and reporting, leaving out extension to accountable state authority. So what are there agencies up to? Have they contributed to South Sudan state-building or failure? What have been their roles in other post-conflict countries, and particularly, South Sudan?

2.2. Regional Examples of Failure of the United Nations

Anders Kompass in his groundbreaking piece *The Ethical Failure: Why I Resigned From UN* argues that the organization has always fallen short of its principles during intervention. With his twenty years' experience with UN, Kompass succinctly emphasizes these failures as below:

Cholera in Haiti, corruption in Kosovo, murder in Rwanda, cover-up of war crimes in Darfur: on too many occasions the UN is failing to uphold the principles and standards set out in its Charter, rules and regulations. Sadly, we seem to be witnessing more and more UN staff less concerned with abiding by the ethical standards of the international civil service than with doing whatever is most convenient – or least likely to cause problems – for themselves or for member states [22].

As a quick learning platform, Congo provides also historical impetus on how development partners have contributed to state failures. Severine Autesserre argues the following on Congo Intervention:

If the international peace builders' only goal had been to set up a functioning government in the Congo, however, they would have withdrawn the peacekeeping troops after the 2006 general elections. If foreign interveners had wanted to maintain order in the eastern provinces, they would also have pulled out the UN troops. Yet, not MONUC stay but, as explained previously, donors even expanded and strengthened the mission. The strategy developed by UN in 2007 and 2008, and later approved by the Security Council, also demonstrated that the states, mostly involved in the Congolese peace process wanted much more than a legitimate government and were pleased about the continued instability. Under this new plan, MONUC had to remain until most Congolese fighters were either integrated into the army or disarmed and demobilized, until the Congolese army and police were able to "assume responsibility for the country's security", and until local elections were organized [3].

Linda Melvern who witnessed Rwanda genocide and documented in her thought-provoking work "A People Betrayed: The Role of West in Rwanda's Genocide, 2009" argues that the failure of UN in Rwanda genocide was lack of coopera-

tion of members states to apply the 1948 Genocide Convention to prevent genocide [16]. Lt. Gen. Romeo Alain Dallaire reinforces this argument by noting that the USA and UK, the traditional permanent members of UN did not only help stopping genocide but also ended up lobbying the UNSC in the withdrawal of 25,000 UNAMIR after 10 Belgians soldiers were killed [6].

2.3. UN in South Sudan State-building and Failure

On South Sudan, one would argue that the UNDP and UNMISS have both built and failed South Sudan state at the same time. Two arguments are critical: institutional building and political expedient to comprehend UNDP and UNMISS state building and failure dictum.

To begin this analysis, institutional building has been one of the core areas where UNDP and UNMISS have contributed so far in South Sudan state-building. To be sure, UNDP established its offices across ten states as early as 2006 to build the government structures and accountability system with a special support to the office of the President. In the office of the President, many advisors contracted by UNDP and assigned to help strengthen accountability system and coach staff to manage decentralization and inter-governmental linkages, could not fix the system well. In state levels, each advisor either on governance, development, rule of law, peace, economy & finance, gender or health issues had been embedded at the Governor's Office, Ministry of Finance, Law Enforcement, Judiciary, Physical Infrastructures, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Agriculture, Gender & Social Welfare to mention but a few to help building robust systems that could enhance accountability, transparency and service delivery. Without any denial, UNDP helped in building and rehabilitating state Police Headquarters, Prison Services, Judiciary, Peace Commissions Offices and so on. These endeavors, managed by the UNDP support to states project helped in charting the state-building in the desired direction. The deployment of more than 350 specialists through both the Rapid Capacity Placement Initiative (RCPI) and IGAD projects has gone a long way to provide much needed coaching and mentoring support of durable nature and enabled accountability for UNDP's programming [25].

However, UNDP is viewed to have contributed to South Sudan state failure. A compelling argument is that with the presence of UNDP advisors to the governments at the ten states plus three administrative area and even within the highest office of the President, rule of law and accountability systems has not helped to improve the functioning of the government. Yet, UNDP has attracted billions of dollars in tandem to South Sudan state-building and reconstruction. Much of these dollars have been allocated to policy work, service delivery and capacity building. Programmes, policy work and service delivery aside, the idea of 'capacity build-

ing' has been a 'big tent' debate and synonymous of 'capacity sucking out' of UNDP of South Sudan. This is because 'Capacity Building' funds have not necessary built the capacities of South Sudanese but have been reused and the monies revolved back to the staff of the donating countries as part of their maintenance abroad.

2.4. UNDP Capacity Sucking out in Lieu of Capacity Building

To be sure, the idea of 'capacity building' has been a tool used to solicit funds from the development community. UNDP and other NGOs have been quite passionate about this idea. However, 'capacity building' has been a practiced of capacity depletion that is 'capacity sucking out' [11]. 'Capacity sucking out' coined by Michael Ignatieff refers to the situation whereby the existing capacities in a polity are not built by the development partners; instead these capacities are attracted by the UN and NGOs, leaving the governments with incompetent and unskilled workforce (Ibid). The development community comes so richly endowed and full of capacities that it tends to crowd out rather than complement the extremely weak state capacities of the targeted countries. This means that while the governance functions are performed, indigenous capacity does not increase; and the countries in question are likely to revert to their former situations once the international development community loses interest or moves to the next crisis area. Thus "capacity sucking out" of UN and INGOs in South Sudan context could apply in the aforementioned argument and moreover refers to drawing out the most qualified South Sudanese from Government to work at their offices, resulting in a brain-drained situation of the Government of South Sudan. So far, the UN sucked the capacities of 103 professional South Sudanese civil servants into the UNDP between 2011-2021. 41 of these senior civil servants were sucked from the Ministry of Education and Instruction, 20 from Ministry of Health, 11 from Ministry of Agriculture, 8 from Ministry of Parliamentary affairs, 15 from the Ministry of Public Service & Human Resource Development and 8 from the Ministry of Cabinet affairs [10]. This state of affairs has resulted so far in making things worse, Francis Fukuyama in his groundbreaking work emphasized on this argument:

There are thus grave limitations to the ability of external powers to create demand for institutions and therefore limitations on the ability to transfer existing knowledge about institutional construction and reform to developing countries. These limitations suggest that international donors and the NGO community more broadly should be cautious about raising expectations for the long-term effectiveness of its new "capacity building" mantra [9].

However, not only that the hypocrisy of "capacity building" has been the case, but participation of donor community in the destruction of capacity through institutional neglect has been something that many scholars overlooked, however,

Francis Fukuyama provides insightful analysis:

But the problem is in fact even worse: The international community is not simply limited in the amount of capacity it can build; it is actually complicit in the destruction of institutional capacity in many developing countries. This capacity destruction occurs despite the best intentions of the donors and is the result of the contradictory objectives that international aid is meant to serve. That poor or collapsing public administration at the heart of Africa's twenty-year development crisis is beyond doubt; since independence, the ability of African governments to design and implement policies has deteriorated [9].

This incapacitated of the African countries by the development community is long overdue. In the words of World Bank's African Governors Forum "almost every African country has witnessed a systematic regression in capacity at independence than they now possess" [26]. This deterioration in capacity has happened precisely during a period of accelerating external aid flows to the point where high GDP of the entire region comes from development community assistance in various forms.

So, in South Sudan, it is probable to argue that true emphasize on capacity building is another form of 'tough love'. 'Tough love' a phrase borrowed from Francis Fukuyama refers to a situation whereby the development partner would condition or dictate the government and its citizens in offering its services [9]. These conditions may not augur well with the country's sovereignty. 'Tough love' with its conditionality, could be very difficult for well-intention people to actually carryout. So, what we get in the meantime is lip service to the importance of capacity building and the continued displacement of institutional capacity by outside donors. Thus, this conundrum does not go away but in fact becomes most severe when external leverage does not comes through nation and state building programmes but rather through arms-length conditionality. Although, the development community knows how to supply government services, what it knows and much less well is how to create self-sustaining indigenous institutions.

2.5. Foreign Dominance of the UNDP Despite 'Capacity Sucking out' in South Sudan

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been dominated by foreign staff in South Sudan despite having sucked capacities from the government. One would have wished the qualified capacities sucked out from the government could have been deployed to the top echelon of the development world body. However, the UNDP cadres' development has been skewed towards maintenance of foreign staff at the highest levels with the nationals at the middle and lowest levels. For example, UNDP South Sudan does have few national specialists and team leaders while International staff dominated the top management of the development agency. As a matter of capacity appreciation, Deputy Coun-

try Director could have gone to the highly experienced South Sudanese national given the availability of pool of this expertise, but this has not been the case with UNDP South Sudan. Although this state of affairs has not been realized as an ingredient of UNDP failure towards South Sudan state-building, the gravity of the denying opportunities for nationals in senior management portfolios has failed the development agency in realizing its goals and outcomes. This comes in the form of government institutions viewing UNDP as a foreign managed entity that does not promote “we feeling” and thus received apathy in the implementation of projects. Most of foreign staff go home every month with huge chunk of money including decent house allowances and air tickets that are not given to even more experienced South Sudanese nationals. In countries such as Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Sudan, most of the salaries paid to the international staff are regulated and much of the resources are channeled to the programmes and projects within a country.

Given that UN & NGOS tight ownership of the jobs and programmes, the Government of South Sudan attempted to threaten and expel the UN & NGOs staff holding senior positions so that South Sudan nationals take over. The exceptions to this move were highly skilled individuals holding positions where such skills are not available in South Sudan. Although a letter to over 100 international aid agencies from South Sudan’s NGO Forum entitled “*Increasing Trend of Harassment and Interference Targeting NGOs, Marked by Increased Hostility and Threats from Officials*”, the Government of South Sudan accepted the rush of such decision without the analysis of pros and cons and eventually rescinded it. Thus halted attempted expulsion of foreign workers and in lieu continued to encourage NGO Forum discussions. Other UN agencies and NGOs exaggerated the government version of laying-off senior UN & NGOs workers to give a room to some experienced South Sudan, as a mean of foreigners’ surveillance and targets. Although the government may encourage the activities of UN and NGOs, it is worried a lot about these activities that can compromise the national security of the country. It is because of these unfounded fears that the government enacted the NGOS Act 2012, on 12th May 2015 amidst protests from the rights groups.

2.6. The Role of UNMISS in South Sudan State-building and Failure

Since the signing of Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in July 2011, UNMISS has been a technical and political wing for institutional building and citizens protection of South Sudan. Its initial mandate ranges from protection of civilians, human rights monitoring and reporting and support for the establishment and extension of accounting state authority. UNMISS also played an important role in keeping the UN Security Council actively abreast with the issues of peace and security in the nascent state. This is the essence of political expedient.

So on political expedient analysis, UNMISS is discerned through its roles in South Sudan state building and failure. At cursory review, UNMISS has contributed to both South Sudan reconstruction and fragility. To be exact, when the inter-ethnic raids intensified in Jonglei-especially in Pibor in 2012, UNMISS intervention prevented possible ethnic cleansing through mass atrocity, asset stripping, wholesale displacement and starvation ([7]). Moreover, it is unforgettable the applauding efforts UNMISS showcased in averting genocide during December 2013 political fiasco. Having accommodated over four hundred thousands civilians during the political crisis in Bentiu, Malakal, Bor and Juba Protection of Civilians Camps, UNMISS appeared as serious stakeholder in South Sudan state-building and consolidation. Thousands of victims of targeted ethnic killings and revenge attacks who sought shelter with UNMISS in Juba, Malakal, Bentiu and Bor found protection. But again did the UNMISS respond on time? Why was it that majority of civilians were lynched in Bor, Akobo, Bentiu, Malakal and Juba to mention but a few in presence of large UNMISS troops? Could that really be a strategic neglect on the side of UNMISS? Even though UNMISS averted genocide, its equally allowed deaths of very many poor South Sudanese in their watch during the elite power pursuit skirmishes. The notion that civilians have to run to the UNMISS compounds to seek protection does not make protection really protection. Yet the responsibility to protect should be exercised to the civilians that have not run to the UNMISS precinct.

Despite this, it is fair to say that UNMISS contribution to South Sudan state reconstruction is applaudable. Not only did UNMISS reign its glory on the protection of civilians, it had also contributed in strengthening the capacities of police force and prison services and modest infrastructure development such as upgrading of rough roads. Nonetheless, UNMISS has been viewed by some South Sudanese to have contributed to South Sudan state crumbling from the onset of the signing of SOFA. SOFA gives UNMISS personnel exclusive rights of travelling everywhere in South Sudan without any restriction, control of special terminal at Juba International Airport (JIA) and implementation of their work programmes without governmental approval [24]. Unfortunately, the SOFA has been abused, thrown under the carpet by some individuals in the UNMISS in tandem of dodging the responsibility and genuine support to South Sudan state-building. For instance, it is alleged that some UNMISS contractors would stay after their contracts have expired to do other illicit businesses [10]. Moreover, some contractors would bring in their girlfriends and boyfriends to South Sudan on the pretext that they are UN contractors (Ibid). This has not only been a pitfall on the implementation of SOFA, but also other serious posers have been associated with the trashing of SOFA. An allegation has it that many UNMISS staff have been trading dollars in the parallel market with even some found to have sophisticated machines of faking united states dollars (Ibid).

What is more, given the exclusive freedom of control of its terminal in JIA, some UNMISS individuals have been alleged to have smuggled in some prohibited drugs such as cocaine, heroine, marijuana to South Sudan soil. Is this really building of South Sudanese state? Still connected to free traveling inside South Sudan without hindrance and together with SOFA's clause of UNMISS assets not to be inspected, UNMISS committed a serious misstep in its history in the world. The captured of UNMISS trucks by a SPLA soldier in Rumbek while transporting assaults of military hardware labeled as humanitarian goods to Bentiu, is attestation to this claim. Although the UNMISS management including the UN Secretary General apologized on 2nd April 2014 for this as gravest mistake arguing that the trucks were wrongly labeled and weapons were destined for Ghanaian Battalion's in Bentiu, the damage of this incident could not exonerate anything but rather pinpoint UNMISS as having an intended plan for South Sudan state failure and not candid building. Although the government has equally bruised UNMISS and breached the SOFA either, the government response had been perhaps done under deep-seated suspicion. The trading of accusations and counter-accusations coupled by deep-seated political suspicion against UNMISS in person of former special enjoy, Hilde F. Johnson made President Kiir to conclude that UN had established parallel Government in South Sudan.

Moreover, the flaming of deep-seated suspicion made South Sudan Minister of Information to threaten shutting down the UN Miraya radio and more over the UN itself if it does not stop interviewing rebels, as he blasted out:

"I will shut down this so-called UN Radio, it keeps on interviewing officials from the rebel groups, so that they can disseminate their ideas freely to the citizens of South Sudan (sic). Radio Miraya has been interviewing rebels and this is the last warning to the management. If it happens again we are going to shut it down. They know what they did this morning and it is unfortunate and if it continues, we will shut you down. And we will put it in writing today. We have been writing to Miraya but their leaders have refused to come. Your Muzungus (whites) are resisting coming to me because they believe they are UN. That UN we will shut down" [2].

While the national Minister of Information threatened the UN, it is a revelation of failure of government to provide protects its citizens. However, Michael Makuei took this to UN challenging sanctions on President Kiir by UN Independent Experts Report on South Sudan as regime change as he notes:

"If they are talking about sanctioning, indicting the President, indicting Riek Machar and so forth, then definitely this is a very clear plan for a regime change. We are quite aware about that and we will see how far it will succeed. In term of response, we will definitely respond to it; it is not strange for anybody to recommend like that because their target and main objective is the regime change; whatever is done, must

be done geared toward right direction" [19].

Other South Sudanese leaders also did the same. For example, the former caretaker Governor of Jonglei State, Late Gen. John Kong Nyuon slammed on UN intentions on pro-pelling sanctions on South Sudanese leaders as he argues:

United Nations have failed Iraq, Somalia and Libya among others, so it (UN) cannot rule South Sudan. The rumor of UNSC 10 year master plan to put South Sudan on the trusteeship so as the UN provide governance, civilian protection as well as preparing elections and providing general security until South Sudanese are ready to take off their own destiny would tantamount to inference in the affairs of foreign state [15].

Even though the 10-year trusteeship has been built on the rumors, the UNSC has been serious on placing targeted sanctions on South Sudan leaders once they failed to conclude negotiations and bring peace on time. UN Peacekeeping Chief, Herve Ladsous provides the insights:

The Security Council has been threatening and imposed sanctions since November 2014 but held off as the IGAD, a regional group tried to mediate the talks. As those talks continue to go nowhere, the Council has taken the first step toward imposing sanctions... The sanctions proposed resolution sets out the criteria for individuals and entities that could be sanctioned, including those who contributed to the conflict, obstructed reconciliation, violated human rights or blocked humanitarian aid efforts [22].

Seeing the signs of sanctions and everyday socio-economic and political challenges South Sudan is dripping through, the South Sudan Government expelled the UNOCHA Boss, Mr. Toby Lanzer for his alleged statements against the government. Presidential Press Secretary Ateny Wek Ateny comprehensively articulates:

When he talked to CNN in Geneva in May 2015, he said the leadership of South Sudan has failed and the country is on the verge of collapse. This statement is irresponsible given that it doesn't give hope to the people of South Sudan and the work of the United Nations is to support the citizens of South Sudan. This is the second time. Last time he made a statement that the country has gone bankrupt and was resorting to printing money, which will upset the balance of payment. That was not the reality. Someone like Toby Lanzer should have realized and appreciated that the fact the people of South Sudan want hope, not despair [21].

Although UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon condemned the decision of expulsion and urged the government to immediately reverse it, his efforts could not bear any fruit. Instead, the willy-nilly relationship between the United Nations and Government of the Republic of South Sudan continued to be precarious, full of deep-seated mistrusts and wild suspicions. Given this situation, it did not come as a surprise that some commentators saw South Sudan as a "testing ground for effective international engagement in fragile states".

But a new situation evolved with fighting amongst presidential guards of President Salva Kiir and 1st Vice President Riek Machar on 8th July 2016 at presidential palace where President Kiir and 1st Vice President Riek were in a security meeting. Although it is not empirically established which faction started the 'dog' fight, the skirmishes engulfed the entire city of Juba and its suburbs with over 1000 people killed, women raped, property looted and destroyed. As the result of uprising political violence and chaos, IGAD-Plus met and endorsed regional intervention force to act as a buffer between Salva Kiir and Riek Machar's troops. The African Union and the wider international community approved the intervention. In September 2016, the UNSC passed resolution number 2304 authorizing the urgent deployment of 4000 strong Regional Protection Force (RPF) to Juba. However, President Kiir rejected the intervention as he argues:

"There are over 12,000 foreign troops here in South Sudan, he added, in reference to peacekeepers working for the UN mission. "What do you need more forces for? What will they come and do (sic)? The UNMISS here has so many foreign troops. So we will not accept even a single soldier. We will not accept that," Kiir emphasized [15].

On twist of things, the government sponsored demonstrations in Bor, Wau and Juba, rejecting the proposed additional force in South Sudan. Yet, the government surprisingly rescinded and accepted the deployment of proposed additional 4000 robust UNMISS troops in South Sudan during the UNSC members visit, led by U.S. Ambassador Samantha Power in September 2016. The Regional Protection Forces (RPFs) later arrived to South Sudan but their impacts on the protection of civilians has remained remote.

The outcomes of government-sponsored demonstrations did not change the decision of IGAD and African Union on the Regional Protection Forces (RPFs) in the nascent state. UNMISS announced an advance party of a construction engineering company from Bangladesh arrived on 20th April, 2017 bringing essential equipment to start the preparation of accommodation and working areas for the RPFs in Juba (Radio Tamazuj, 2017). "Regional troops from Rwanda followed in June and July 2017," the UN mission said, noting that the RPF headquarters had already been established in Juba under the leadership of Brigadier General Jean Mupenzi from Rwanda [8].

Though the U.S. backed up this intervention decision on a strong term, it argued that UNMISS is not doing enough. Samantha Power argues "UNMISS as it is currently configured, has proven unable – and in some cases unwilling – to prevent horrors like this". Her stand on the resolution of UNSC was backed up by all-powerful member states [4]. However, as the report on the investigation of UNMISS response on 8th July 2016 political meltdown was released on 1st November 2016, the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon sacked the overall commander of UNMISS in South

Sudan, Lt. General Johnson Mogo Kimani Odieki on the ground that he failed to lead peacekeepers in protection of civilians, even at the UN precinct. Guardian argues on the report:

"A UN special investigation found that a lack of leadership by the the UN mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), spear-headed by Lt Gen Johnson Mogo Kimani Ondieki, culminated in a "chaotic and ineffective response" during heavy fighting in the capital between 8 and 11 July". Peacekeepers abandoned their posts and failed to respond to pleas for help from aid workers under attack in Terrian, a nearby hotel compound to UNMISS headquarters according to a summary of the report" [12].

The damned UN report has serious findings as emphasized: "The special investigation found that UNMISS did not respond effectively to the violence due to an overall lack of leadership, preparedness and integration among the various components of the mission," said UN spokesman Stéphane Dujarric. Chinese peacekeepers abandoned their positions at least twice and Nepalese peacekeepers failed to stop looting inside the UN compound, the inquiry found. Ban said he was "deeply distressed by these findings" and "alarmed by the serious shortcomings" of the UN mission. Dujarric said the UN chief had "asked for the immediate replacement of the force commander", Ondieki. Other measures would follow, added Dujarric [15].

The Government of Kenya reacted negatively to the UN Secretary General decision arguing that its commander has been tossed as a sacrificial lamb for something outside his control. The Kenyan government argued that Lt. Gen. Odieki assumed his office in June 2016, a month before, the bloody political showdown before President Kiir forces and Dr. Riek dissident's soldiers. Kenya vowed to disengage from peace process in South Sudan through withdrawal of its forces and development of apathy to the contribution for Regional Protection Forces (RPFs). A week later after the sacking of Lt. Gen. Odieki, 9th November 2016 to be exact, the first 100 soldiers arrived to Kenya from South Sudan on the first leg of withdrawals. The in-charge commander of the withdrawal process argues:

"We are pulling out the whole contingent in South Sudan, over 1000 soldiers. This one is dependent on the logistics that the UN is going to give us. Today we have started. We expect some tomorrow, we expect them alternatively every other day," said Gen Bewot [17].

Thus, if Kenya could have completely withdrawn its peacekeeping troops in South Sudan and refused to contribute troops to the robust Regional Protection Force (RPF) in tandem to UNSC resolution 2304, the chance of genuine peace in South Sudan would be quite slim. It is great that the UN negotiated with Government of Kenya on the best way possible and resolved the impasse. It is appropriate that the world body negotiated and cajoled Kenya to send her troops back to South Sudan. Indeed, Kenya agreed on the negotia-

tions and finally sent back its troops as part of peacekeeping UNMISS in South Sudan. However, Civilians fleeing the traumas of war have lived in extremely difficult circumstances with great uncertainty about the future and amidst complex legal, administrative, and humanitarian challenges of UN protection [30].

2.7. UN Programmes Duplication and Donor Fund Overstretched in State-building and Failure of South Sudan

UN agencies have resorted to the latest deficit of programmes duplication and donor fund overstretched. Many programmes have been tailored the same by different organizations with different donor funding. The intention could have been a strategy of chasing donor funds to support administrative functions of the organization. For instance, UNDP has a programme for gender equity and women empowerment that is under taken also by UNMISS and UN-Women. Besides, UNDP has a robust unit of support to rule of law and democratic governance, which UNMISS has as support to rule of law and security institutions. Moreover, UNDP has conflict resolution and crises recovery unit that support community dialogues to resolve conflicts and bring peace amongst the communities using homegrown solutions. Similar to this is UNMISS recovery, reintegration and peace building unit that undertakes community dialogue to resolve conflicts, build peace and dialogue amongst the communities. UNDP conflict resolution and crises recovery unit is similar to UNMISS recovery, reintegration and peace building support and DDR programme, particularly, security sector reform. While UNICEF supports children protection, UNMISS does entirely the same programme.

The list of these duplication is so long. So, why doing all these duplication in programmes design? What is the sole reason of duplication of the programmes yet these agencies are aware of organizations competencies? As argued elsewhere in this study, most of these UN agencies especially UNDP and UNMISS have done these duplication to attract donor funds so that they support the administrative budgets of their offices. It doesn't matter what paradigm to use, having the same programmes design imply well-thought out intentions to milk the donor funds for development subterfuge. This has credence of a support to state failure rather than state building.

3. Methodology

3.1. Research Design

The study deployed mixed research design encompassing quality and quantitative methods which enhanced deep analysis and discussions of the results. Indeed, research design is an engine of the entire research [14].

3.2. Research Site

The study was carried out in Juba, South Sudan. Juba is the biggest city with largest base of United Nations. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) all have country offices in Juba. Whereas Juba is centre of intellectual discourse with many universities located there, it is the hub for United Nations programmes and activities.

3.3. Sources of Information

The study used both primary and secondary sources of data. Primary data was obtained through interviews and surveys. Secondary sources of data was obtained via content analysis of empirical literatures, periodicals and reports from United Nations offices in Juba.

3.4. Population and Sampling Types

The study targeted population of 400 respondents with persuasive and cluster sampling techniques. It is persuasive because the researcher targeted those with knowledge on the role of United Nations on South Sudanese state-building and failure. These respondents were later clustered around those working at the United Nations, academics, government officials and intellectuals in South Sudan.

3.4.1. Determination of Sample Size

The sample size of this study was derived using a formula designed by Taro Yamane (1967) with 95% level of confidence and when the size of the target population is known [28]. The size (n) is determined based on the below formula:

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + (e)^2}$$

Where N= population size, e=level of precision (0.05), n= sample size

$$n = \frac{400}{1 + 400(0.05^2)}$$

$$n = \frac{400}{1 + 400(0.0025)}$$

$$n = \frac{400}{1 + 1}$$

$$n = \frac{400}{2}$$

$$= 200$$

3.4.2. Sample Size of the Study

After determination of sample size from study population as shown above, the sample size of the study came to 200

respondents. This number was sufficient in drawing credible conclusions.

3.5. Data Collection Instruments

The study deployed data collection tools such as questionnaires and interview guides/schedules to collect the data on the role of United Nations in South Sudanese state-building and failure in Juba. Questionnaires, interview guides / schedules were administered effectively.

3.5.1. Piloting of Research Instruments

Research instruments such as questionnaires and interview guides were piloted to ensure that the instruments were compatible and correct. 10% of sample size (200) that came to 20 questionnaires and interview guides were administered to 20 respondents.

3.5.2. Results of Piloting of Research Instruments

Questions that were poorly and equivocally drafted were corrected from this piloting exercise before actual data collection. This really helped in serving time, money and energy during fieldwork.

3.6. Quality/Error Control

The study ensured that quality was prioritized and errors during the collection of data were eschewed. Reliability and validity mechanisms of data collection were applied and 200 sample size were reached on time and the information was noted expeditiously.

3.7. Reliability

A Cronbach Alpha Reliability Coefficient (CARC) of 0.811 was obtained which is above 0.7 and thus, the research instruments were found to be reliable. Cronbach Alpha is used to determine the internal consistency and reliability of any study. Cronbach Alpha is therefore calculated by correlating the score of each scale item with the total score for each determination (normally surveyed respondents or test takers) and then comparing that to the variance for all respondents item scores.

3.8. Validity

The validity of study instruments was assessed using expert judgments such as professional opinion from peers and supervisors [14]. Ten experts were contacted to critically evaluate the validity of the instruments. The experts were asked to rate questions depending on their relevancy. The Content Validity Index (C.V.I) was established by dividing the number of items rated relevant and total number of items. It is clear that CVI was 0.785 which was above 0.7 and thus research instruments were

considered valid.

3.9. Data Processing and Analysis

The study deployed data processing and analysis applications such as SPSS 2.1 and Microsoft excel where possible to interpret and present the data. Cleaning up of the data was carried out and analysis were presented appropriately.

3.10. Ethics in Research

The study considered ethics in research. Examples of ethics in research such as confidentiality, assent, consent, anonymity, integrity and benevolence were applied during the entire research process. All respondents that were surveyed and interviewed were considered very confidential. There were no any ethical challenge encountered during the whole research process.

4. Results and Discussions

4.1. UN in South Sudanese State-building and Failure

The 200-surveyed respondents brought out their mixed views about the role of UN in South Sudanese state-building and failure. 80 respondents representing 40% noted that UN has helped in building South Sudan state citing the roles of UN in development programmes, humanitarian aid service, peace building programmes, human rights and access to justice support. They argued that based on its mandate the UN has done very well. One of the emphasized points is the UNDP support to states, rule of law, justice, health and education including the United Nations Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS) that cover the remotest parts of South Sudan. The respondents lamented that without this air service South Sudan could have been easily cut off from herself. Moreover, respondents added that had there been no UN in South Sudan there would have been terrible genocide at the onset of 15th December 2013 and 8th July 2016.

However, about 120 respondents representing 60% said that UN has failed South Sudan State. These respondents argue that UN took side with the rebels from the genesis of 15th December 2013 and 8th July 2016 political violence and has been up for regime change. They illustrated this allegation from the captured of the UN container truck at Rumbek town of Lakes State with weapons and ammunition, which was labeled as UN goods. The truck, the respondents' believed was taking the weapons and ammunition to the rebels in greater Upper Nile region. However, the UN admitted the wrong labeling and argued that the weapons and ammunition were destined to Ghanaian Contingents in Bentiu, the presence Unity State. What is more, the flown of the Chairperson of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and two other UN

national workers all of them Jonglei Dinka by ethnicity to the rebels controlled area of Jiech without their knowledge in March 2015 caused a public outcry about the desired intention of UN in South Sudan political conflicts and violence. Though spared by the rebels, the incident unleashed serious psychological stresses to the trio and the families. These incidents have led to mistrust between the UN and citizenry leading to widespread demonstrations against the UN, particularly, the former special envoy of Secretary General and Head of UNMISS, Hilde F. Johnson. The affair has remained on some citizens' minds as a way of undermining South Sudan's sovereignty.

Moreover, the respondents argue that the UN has not helped much in the protection of the civilians. Given that UNMISS is under UNSC Chapter VII with *resolution 2252* where the peacekeepers should defend civilians at all account and themselves from physical threats irrespective of the source of threats, the UN failed to prevent Akobo's attack where the angry white army youth militia fired at the Protection of Civilians Site (PoCs) and killed all those who sought protection at the Akobo's UNMISS base. The UNMISS Indian battalion was overwhelmed when three of their troops got killed, over run and hence allowed the belligerents youth to massacre all 35 Dinka in Akobo UNMISS base. Besides, the Jonglei Dinka youth attacked the UNMISS Bor PoCs camp and killed more than 25 Nuer civilians while the UNMISS Korean battalion looked on. In addition, the Malakal's PoCs in February 17th 2016 was attacked by the Padang Dinka youth leading to more than 34 people dead and 51 people wounded. This attack took place before the UNMISS peacekeepers and the troops could not protect the civilians under their watch. Given these incidents, the respondents argued that the UN has created differences amongst South Sudanese society by taking a back seat while watching South Sudan state falling apart.

Furthermore, the respondents believed that the UN has focused on local conflicts and has left political conflicts at the national level. They argued that UN officials have encouraged South Sudan state failure so as to prolong their stay in South Sudan. The respondents noticed that the UN lacks balance between the ruling and opposition parties given the comments of Ellen Margrethe Loj, the former head of UNMISS over the need for suspension of the then 28 states now 32 States. Respondents finally argued that because of this role, the government has responded in denying UN free delivery of humanitarian aid to all conflicts affected citizens in South Sudan. Given the refusal by both the UN and Government to open up and interact freely, mistrust and bad working relationships has ensued. The passing of *resolution 2304* by UNSC on the deployment of 4000 robust Regional Protection Force (RPF) in August 2016 to South Sudan to guard vital installation such as Juba International Airport (JIA), humanitarian premises and protect civilians regardless of source of fire validated the Government's fear on UN role in regime change in South Sudan.

4.2. UNMISS and UNDP in South Sudanese State-building and Failure

On specific cases of UNMISS and UNDP, respondents' views were sought. The 200 surveyed respondents gave interesting but separate views of UNMISS and UNDP in state building and failure. Majority of respondents believed that UNMISS is not righteous and has contributed to South Sudan state failure while UNDP is clean and has contributed to state construction. They have repeatedly argued that the captured of ammunition and machine guns by the Government of South Sudan in Rumbek in 2014 ferried by UN truck and clearly marked as goods destined to former Bentiu-Unity State remained a major accusation on UNMISS as a partner in 15th December 2013 rebellions. Although the top UN leadership apologized for the wrong labeling on the ground that the weapons were indeed destined to Bentiu for UNMISS Ghanaian battalion's defence and protection, the Government of South Sudan has not yet been convinced by such technical and political error by highly esteemed organization. Besides, the respondents noted that the captured of two armoured T-55 tanks labeled with UN colours and emblem in Bor by SPLA from rebels in February 2014 insinuated that the UNMISS has a hidden agenda in supporting South Sudanese political violence. In addition, the possession of arms by the civilians in PoCs, particularly, in Juba, Bor and Malakal questioned either the inability or complacent of UN in rebellions for South Sudan state failure.

Although the respondents' emphasized that the problems of supporting the rebels could not be an official UN policy, they pin-pointed fingers to leaders of the UN, in peculiar, the former head of UNMISS, Hilde F. Johnson as having a special relationship with Dr. Riek Machar, the SPLM-IO leader. Hence, they noticed that the UNMISS reports against the government and people such as "*Government Licensed Soldiers To Rape or Rape is a Government Policy in Bentiu*" is a strategy to humiliate and tarnish the government and people of South Sudan as having 'animal spirits' in dealing with wars related issues. This report according to the respondents is a part of the agenda for regime change and state failure of South Sudan.

Moreover, respondents consistently argued that although UNMISS has helped in peace building efforts such as local mediations, capacity building, employment of nationals, provision of logistics to the 2010 elections, averting of ethnic genocide during the onset of 15th December 2013 and 8th July 2016 political violence as well as support to R-ARCSS, it has a hidden goal of installing UN Trusteeship in South Sudan. The respondents interestingly added that UNMISS supports wars for renewal of its mandates in South Sudan.

On the other hand, the respondents said that UNDP has been neutral, focusing on the state building and recovery. These respondents emphasized that UNDP has been supporting service delivery and capacity building programmes to police service, prison service and local government, support

to states & small arms control, access to justice & rule of law, health, peace building programmes and education such as the construction of University of Juba's Law School to mention but a few have helped in building South Sudanese state.

However, respondents argued that the capacity building programme has not created much positive impact on the Government and citizens alike as UNDP's built capacities have narrowly remained for their own employees leaving the government with 'capacity deficit'. This is because capacities built are attracted back by UNDP through good salary package and this has encouraged young talented competent citizens to exodus to UNDP leaving government helpless. The respondents also charged that foreigners have heavily dominated UNDP accolade jobs, particularly top management dockets such as Country Director, Deputy Country and Specialists. This according to the respondents had kept foreigners paid handsomely as international staff, receiving lavish salary every month in addition to accommodation in expensive apartments in South Sudan. However, their counterparts, national staff who are equally educated on the same measure or more are receiving averaged salaries without benefits such as fancies accommodations.

Finally, few respondents argued as much as them (the citizens) blame others for South Sudanese state failure, the conundrums they are facing, as a country is South Sudanese government making.

4.3. UN 'Capacity Building' of South Sudanese Cadres

Tapping the views on 'capacity building verse capacity sucking out' of South Sudanese cadres, the 200-surveyed respondents had very interesting responses. Few believed that UN indeed did capacity building programmes for the government and people of South Sudan. They cited the training and mentorship of police force, prison servicemen & women and members of parliament, members of political parties and the political executive officers. They noted that UN designed these capacity building programmes including sponsorship of government officials abroad. The conundrum they argued is related to the capacity of cadres the government recommend for trainings and mentor-ships as most of them ended up without grasping the trainings and as a consequent failed to pass it to others. They emphasized that there are a lot of government officials who have been trained but they have remained un-trainable for life. Although there

could be some few capacities that have been built for the country, lack of institution impetus and culture to apply these capacities has remained a hurdle to the Government of South Sudan.

However, majority of respondents argued that the UN did the 'capacity sucking out' rather than 'capacity building'. They cited that UN trained the government officials and send them back to their institutions without mentorship or monitoring and evaluation of the impacts of these trainings. Moreover, a lot of these trained officials tend to get attracted to UN jobs thus often leaving the government incapacitated. In other words, the respondents argued that the UN does 'crowding out of the skills' from the government to itself. Besides, the respondents noted that the UN capacity building programmes have always been mismatched and misplaced. This is because they are not well schemed to 'We Feeling' of the beneficiary institutions of South Sudan. Although the UN occasionally carryout training needs assessments, they have not been comprehensive, well tailored and bottom up. Moreover, the senior staff of UN, particularly, UNDP has been posting experts to the Government of South Sudan's ministries. These experts have not yielded tangible blueprint for knowledge transfer, as their nature of deployment has been provision of strategic advises but not critical capacity building. Given this affair, the impact of the capacity building programmes has never been felt strongly in the Government of South Sudan service delivery strategy.

Further still, the respondents emphasized that the UN has been relying on foreigners (international staff) to run their top management positions. These foreigners are paid excellent salary package while their counterparts (nationals) who do a lot of work are paid little monies. Hence, the respondents lamented if there were indeed genuine capacity building programmes UN has delivered, it will have capacitated the nationals and led them take up the top dockets in South Sudan. Because of this, the respondents view the capacity building concept as a fallacy meant to attract funds from donors.

4.4. UN and Government Working Relations


This variable tries to gauge working relationship between UN and Government of Republic of South Sudan. The views of respondents were surveyed and results are shown as below.

Table 1. View of the UN and government working relations.

| Categories | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| No Idea | 8 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 |
| Cordial | 16 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 12.0 |

| Categories | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Trustworthy | 20 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 22.0 |
| Hostile | 23 | 11.5 | 11.5 | 33.5 |
| Mistrust & Suspicion | 133 | 66.5 | 66.5 | 100.0 |
| Total | 200 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Source: Fieldwork



Source: Constructed by the Researcher

Figure 1. UN and government of South Sudan working relations.


Table 1 and Figure 1 above show the results of the respondents on the relationship between UN and the Government of South Sudan. When asked on this question, overwhelming 133 respondents, representing 67% argue that the relationship is based on mistrust and suspicion citing the captured of the weapons ferried by UN truck and marked as goods in Rumbek in 2014. Although the UN senior leadership apologized for such technical error, arguing that the truck was wrongly marked and indeed the weapons were destined to Bentiu for UNMISS Ghanaian battalion, the Government of South Sudan has not been convinced by such explanation.

Besides, 23 respondents, representing 11% felt that the relationship is hostile given the trading of the accusations and counter-accusations by the Government against the UN and vice versa. The bickering began with the Minister of Information, Michael Makuei's allegations over the role of UN in supporting rebels and his threats to shut down the UN Radio (Miraya Radio) in South Sudan. This was also followed by the UN report on rape in South Sudan in March 2016 referring that the Government of South Sudan has licensed its

soldiers to rape freely in Bentiu in lieu of salaries. The UN argued in the report that it was the Government of South Sudan policy to allow the soldiers to 'help themselves' and rape women and girls as much as they can. This leitmotif has been duped as 'do what you can and take what you can'. Given these accusations and counter-accusations, the respondents believe that the relationship is hostile.

Moreover, 20 respondents, representing 10% argued that the relationship is trustworthy citing the calling of the Government of South Sudan for humanitarian support and the response of the UN in providing aid and other institutional support. They also argued that there exist collaboration programmes between the Government of South Sudan and UN working together, particularly peace building programmes. 16 respondents, representing 8% noted that the relationship is cordial citing acceptance of the Government of South Sudan to renew Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) annually and commitment to work closely with UN.

Finally, 8 respondents, representing 4% did not have any answer on the relationship between UN and the Government of South Sudan and thus did not provide any opinion.



Source: Constructed by the Researcher

Figure 2. Grading of UN and government working relationship.

Table 2. Grading UN and government working relations.

| Categories | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| No Idea | 6 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 |
| Excellent | 6 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 6.0 |
| Very good | 10 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 11.0 |
| Good | 27 | 13.5 | 13.5 | 24.5 |
| Fair | 70 | 35.0 | 35.0 | 59.5 |
| Poor | 81 | 40.5 | 40.5 | 100.0 |
| Total | 200 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Source: Fieldwork

Table 2 and Figure 2 above provide respondents' opinions on the grading of the relationship between the UN and the Government of South Sudan. 81 respondents representing 41%, grade the working relationship between the UN and Government as poor citing the suspicion between the Government and the UN. This according to the respondents is compounded by the government allegation that UN supports or rather sympathizes with the rebels and opposition groups. UN also views the Government as a totalitarian to its people and a threat to UN operations. Hence, respondents feel that the gun down of the UN helicopter in Pibor by SPLA in December 2012 killing all four Russians on board was the beginning of the poor working relationship. 70 respondents representing 35% grade working relationship as fair, citing the continuous collaboration between the UN and the Government on security, peace and humanitarian programmes.

27 respondents representing 13% grade the working relationship as good citing the Government continuous renewal of the SOFA and UNMISS mandate annually. This according to

the respondents demonstrates the good working relationship despite the challenges. 10 respondents representing 5% grade the working relationship as very good, citing the many cooperation programmes both the Government and UN work together. They added that the Government officials have substantially benefited from the UN services such as training, mentorship and logistics. They argued that given this very good working relationship, the Government officials continued to get flight services from United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) and this has boosted service delivery at the remotest parts of South Sudan. What is more, 6 respondents, representing 3% grade the working relationship as excellent citing that the UN and Government have improved communication strategies and hence this continued to help in implementing the mandates of the two organization. Besides, they noted that since the taking over of the UN role by Nicholas Haysom in South Sudan, there has been considerably improved working relationship compared to the previous special envoys. 6 respondents representing 3% have no idea over the


UN and government working relationship and they did not grade this relationship.

4.5. UN and Regime Change in South Sudan

Table 3. UN and regime change in South Sudan.

| Categories | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| No Answer | 5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 |
| Agreed | 48 | 24.0 | 24.0 | 26.5 |
| Strongly agreed | 72 | 36.0 | 36.0 | 62.5 |
| Disagreed | 24 | 12.0 | 12.0 | 74.5 |
| Strongly disagreed | 19 | 9.5 | 9.5 | 84.0 |
| No idea | 32 | 16.0 | 16.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 200 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Source: Fieldwork



Source: Constructed by the Researcher

Figure 3. UN and regime change in South Sudan.

Table 3 and Figure 3 above provide critical analysis on the perceptions of the citizens toward the UN in regime change political game in South Sudan. Asked about UN role in allegedly regime change and support to the rebels, 72 respondents, representing 36% strongly agreed citing the captured of weapons in Rumbek on March 2014 that were labeled as goods by UN destined to Bentiu. Although the UN senior

leadership in New York apologized for the wrong labeling arguing that the assortment of weapons and ammunition were destined to UNMISS Ghanaian’s battalion in Bentiu, the authorities of the Government of South Sudan have not been convinced. The respondents emphasized that it is irregular for the UN; the most highly esteemed organization to wrongly and inadequately labeled its cargo vehicles. Moreo-

ver, SOFA and other policy agreements between the UNMISS and the government stipulates that UN weapons are supposed to be airlifted in lieu of transporting them by roads. This, according to respondents justifies the agenda for regime change. Besides, 48 respondents, representing 24% agreed that UN in South Sudan is in the game for regime change. They cited the constant sanctions being renewed against the individuals in the government and the meddling of UN in internal politics of South Sudan. The respondents emphasized the former head of UNMISS, Loj's comments over the suspension of unilateral declared 32 States by President Kiir as an overstretched of UNMISS mandate in South Sudan. Moreover, some respondents noted that the UN is working around the clock for South Sudan State collapse so that it can mount Trusteeship and Protectorate.

However, 24 respondents representing 12% disagreed with the notion that the UN is set for regime change and support the rebels in South Sudan. They argued that it is the Government of South Sudan that is failing itself and it should not point fingers elsewhere. They emphasized that the looming failure and collapse of South Sudan is not UN making but it is a curse of leadership that lack vision to emancipate South Sudanese

people. Moreover, 19 respondents representing 10% strongly disagreed arguing that UN does not have an agenda for regime change in the nascent. They argued that if anything, the UN has helped South Sudan to prosperity. They added that UN endeavour to discharge its role and mandate as international government and by the virtue that South Sudan signed up to the charter on September 2011, it has no option but to serve on the basis of laid down regulations and norms of the UN. In addition, the respondents argued that UNMISS averted one of the worse genocides in the history of the world during the onset of 15th December 2013 political fiasco in South Sudan. Hence, the respondents noted that the mantra of regime change is a solid bulwark the government supporters used to deflect the government failure from the citizens inquiry. Thus, they noted that some of the country widespread demonstrations against the UN conducted in 2014 and early 2015 were sponsored by the Government so as to tell the citizens that it is the UN that sparked the 15th December 2013 political ignominy.

Finally, 32 respondents, representing 16% has no idea over the question and 5 respondents, representing 2% did not answer the question for reasons known to them.

Table 4. Ranking UNDP and UNMISS programme support to South Sudan.

| Categories | Ranking (1-5) | Frequency | Percent |
|--|---------------|-----------|---------|
| State Recovery and Conflict Mitigation | 3 | 30 | 15 |
| Democracy, Rule of Law and Human Rights | 2 | 62 | 31 |
| DDR and Security Sector Reform | 4 | 21 | 11 |
| Protection of Civilians | 5 | 09 | 4 |
| Institutional Support, Policy Development and Service Delivery | 1 | 78 | 39 |
| Total | | 200 | 100 |

Source: Fieldwork

Table 4 computed the views of 200 surveyed respondents regarding the ranking of the United Nations Programmes in South Sudan. 78 respondents representing 39% ranked the UN most 1st effective programme as institutional support, policy development and service delivery in South Sudan. They cited the institutional support UNDP has given to the Government of South Sudan since the government inception in 2006. Programmes such as support to states & local governments, commissioners and Governors' fora, support to the Office of the President (OoP) and humanitarian outreach to IDPs are some of the sub-programmes the UN has delivered under institutional support, policy development and service delivery. The impact of this programme has been positive in setting of government institutions in South Sudan, particularly at the states, administrative areas and local government levels. Without this UN programme, the semblance of the

existing government institutions would have not been set up.

Besides, 62 respondents representing 31% preferred democracy, rule of law and human rights making it as the next 2nd most effective programme the UN has done in South Sudan to support state-building and survivability. The argument is that UNDP democracy and participation sub-programmes, rule of law and access to justice and UNMISS support to human rights sub-programmes have been so rigorous that helped the Government of South Sudan in state voyage. This programme covered the civil society organizations (CSOs), the police service, prison service, wildlife, civil defence (fire brigade) and judiciary to mention but a few. Although the impacts have not influenced the overall prosperity to all South Sudanese, critical efforts were exerted by UNDP and UNMISS on these programmes.

Moreover, the next ranked 3rd programme is the state re-


covery and conflict mitigation. 30 respondents, representing 15% chose the programme making it the 3rd lower ranked programme. The deduced argument is that UNDP has endeavored to provide livelihood activities for the women and youth in empowering them so that they contribute to state building. These livelihood activities are geared towards conflict mitigation. Although the UN has not been effective in conflict mitigation, the early conflict warning mechanism has been in place so far. This helped in avoiding highly tragic genocide by Lou Nuer Youth in December 2011 against Murle. However, the early conflict warning mechanism could not help in eschewing 15th December 2013 political crisis and massacres committed by Murle against Jieng Jonglei.

Further still the next lower 4th ranking is the DDR and Security Sector Reform. 21 respondents, representing 11% chose the programme making it as the next UN lower programme. The argument is that although UNMISS and UNDP

supported the DDR sub programme, small arms control and the overall security sector reform, no positive tangible result has been realized so far from this programme. The revelation is that the SPLA and other regular security forces have continued to balloon in numbers, arrogant with impunity and the civil population has armed itself to the teeth.

Finally, the lowest ranking 5th programme is protection of civilians. 9 respondents, representing 4%, ranked the protection of civilians 5th programme, making it the UN less effective programme. The argument is that the UNMISS peacekeepers have not been successful in protection of civilians during the 15th December 2013 towards the implementation of compromised peace deal. The failure of UN peacekeepers in Juba, Akobo, Bor and Malakal at the Protection of Civilians Site (PoCs) has been frequently cited by respondents, making UN as less effective in protection of civilians in South Sudan.

4.6. Keeping South Sudan from Collapse



Source: Constructed by the Author

Figure 4. Keeping South Sudan from collapse.

Table 5. Keeping South Sudan from collapse.

| Categories | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| No Idea | 8 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 |
| Government efforts | 54 | 27.0 | 27.0 | 31.0 |
| Resilience of citizens | 94 | 47.0 | 47.0 | 78.0 |
| International Community | 36 | 18.0 | 18.0 | 96.0 |
| Regional efforts | 8 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 200 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Source: Fieldwork

Table 5 and Figure 4 have analyzed the important element that is preventing South Sudan from collapse. Agreeing that South Sudan is a failed or a failing state, it has not yet collapsed. The question further explored that virtue as well as actor that keeps the state surviving despite the overwhelming challenges. Tapping this virtue from 200 surveyed respondents, 94 respondents, representing 47% argued that it is the resilience of the citizens that has prevented the nascent state from total collapse. These respondents cited the experience of the citizens from the past civil wars, hope for the future and apathy against the government. 54 respondents, representing 27% said it is through the government efforts that the state has not collapsed. They cited the government acceptance of the August 2015 and September 2018 peace deal that led to the formation of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) and the government commitment to stabilize the country. Besides, 36 respondents, representing 18% viewed that it is the International Community that has kept South Sudanese state from collapse. These respondents cited the institutional and humanitarian assistance members of International Community have delivered so far to South Sudan. They acknowledged Trioka countries (U.S., UK and Norway) support since the establishment of the Government of South Sudan in 2006 throughout to the independence in 2011 and during political violence of 2013 and 2016 to date. The respondents emphasized intense pressure exerted to the parties to sign August 2015 and September 2018 peace deals by the International Community. Moreover, they noted that without the support of the international community, many lives would have been lost in South Sudan.

Furthermore, 8 respondents, representing 4% argued that it is regional efforts that saved South Sudan from collapse. These respondents cited the regional peace efforts through IGAD Plus, which the IGAD members States played critical role in pushing the parties to the signing of deal. Respondents reiterated that without IGAD intervention from 19th December 2013 four days at the time the political violence devastated the country and followed by the IGAD Head of States and Government meeting on 27th December 2013, South

Sudan would have been a collapsed state. More still, respondents noted that without the military intervention of Uganda with approximately 3,000 Ugandan Peoples' Defence Forces (UPDF), South Sudan would have descended into genocide and it would have been no more. The Tumaini Initiative which was initiated by President William Ruto is another regional bolster in preventing South Sudanese state from collapse. Finally, 8 respondents, representing 4% had no idea on the question asked.

5. Conclusions

The United Nations role in South Sudanese state-building and failure has been impeccably demonstrated through the Government of South Sudanese constant accusations on the internal interference of its affairs edging to state failure. While these accusations may sound overboard, there have been glaring evidence to them. Example of UNMISS captured weapons destined to Bentiu in Rumbek in 2014 labeled as UN Container Truck ferrying goods to the Unity region appeared as UNMISS secret involvement in the 2013 rebellions. Besides, the failure of UNMISS peacekeeping forces in protection of civilians across South Sudan during 2013 and 2016 political violence demonstrated the UN weakness as a peace partner in South Sudan and this as showcased in empirical literature and fieldwork revealed the UNMISS role in South Sudanese state failure. The UNDP model of capacity building programme turned out as "capacity sucking out" as majority of trained South Sudanese were sucked to the UNDP through competitive salaries leaving South Sudanese government with weak human resources. The duplication of programmes by both the UNDP and UNMISS has been viewed as a way of overstretching the donors in failing South Sudanese state. Nonetheless, the UNDP and UNMISS have endeavored to build South Sudanese state through peace building programmes, support to the states and administrative areas, national institutional support such as annual Governors fora and stability programmes to the recovery of South Sudan from protracted conflicts. Although South Su-

danese state has failed, it has not collapsed and this is because of the South Sudanese resilience in living with their failed government. There is a need of South Sudanese government to take firmly its constitutional role in providing developmental services as well as protect its citizens in the eventuality of political violence and civil war in South Sudan.

6. Recommendations for Future Research

While the researcher don't presume to have exhaustively researched on the role of United Nations in South Sudanese state-building and failure, future empirical research is hereby recommended on the how the UN (UNDP and UNMISS) and Government of South Sudan can improve through working relationships for sustainable South Sudan state building and prosperity of South Sudanese citizens.

Abbreviations

| | |
|--------|---|
| CPA | Comprehensive Peace Agreement |
| DDR | Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| IGAD | Intergovernmental Authority on Develoepment |
| JIA | Juba International Airport |
| MONUC | Mission de l' organization des Nations Unies Pour La Stabilization Republique Democratique Du Congo |
| RCPI | Rapid Capacity Placement Initiative |
| RPF | Regional Protection Force |
| SOFA | Status of Forces Agreement |
| SPLA | Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNMISS | United Nations Mission in South Sudan |
| UNOCHA | United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |

Author Contributions

Jacob Dut Chol Riak is the sole author. The author read and approved the final manuscript.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

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