



ISSN: 0975-833X

Available online at <http://www.journalcra.com>

International Journal of Current Research

Vol. 17, Issue, 02, pp.31846-31856, February, 2025
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.24941/ijcr.48551.02.2025>

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
OF CURRENT RESEARCH

RESEARCH ARTICLE

UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENTS: A GLOBAL REFLECTIONS

***Jacob Dut Chol Riak, PhD.**

Senior Researcher and Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Juba, South Sudan

ARTICLE INFO

Article History:

Received 25th November, 2024
Received in revised form
20th December, 2024
Accepted 24th January, 2025
Published online 27th February, 2025

Key Words:

Political, Institutions, Governments,
Scrutiny, Global, Experience, Political
Systems, Parliamentary, Presidential,
Hybrid.

*Corresponding author:

Jacob Dut Chol Riak, PhD.

ABSTRACT

Institutions have surfaced as engine of any government. While the government is the product of the state, it must be driven by the engine and in this case, the engine is the institutions and more specifically, political institutions. Building up from the work of John R. Common (2002) and Gabriel Almond (2007), institutions remain critical for effective functioning of the state and government. The study argues institutions as rules, procedures, policies, laws, regulations and systems that work in constraint in any given polity. The study surveys political institutions and particularly, political systems such as parliamentary, presidential and hybrid (mixed) using various global case studies. These three political systems were tested through empirical literature and each was found to have merits and demerits. Although any country can pick up any political system, it must be born in mind that the chosen political system must be contextual and environmentally relevant to that particular society. While the study appreciates the existing of political institutions, it argues that the working of such political institutions become paramount. Although the institutions must be effective and deliver require services, they must be driven by strong individuals. Having no established institution is bad. However, having established weak institutions is worse and above all, having strong institutions without strong individuals is a disaster to any state and government. After critical scrutiny of the global experience, the study concludes that institutions must be established, a culture to respect these institutions must be inculcated to the elites and for the institutions to produce good results, they must be run by strong and competent individuals with the highest integrity in that particular country.

Copyright©2025, Jacob Dut Chol Riak, PhD. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Citation: Riak, J. D. C. .2025. "Understanding Political Institutions of Governments: A Global Reflections..". *International Journal of Current Research*, 17, (02), 31846-31856.

INTRODUCTION

Institutions and particularly, political institutions have emerged as very critical in political science studies and most often in comparative politics. While institutions have remained as the threads and bridges of services delivery, they have remained historical as well (Pierson, 2004). Born in the western world, political institutions have moved and became pillars of any state. The first, second and third world wars ushered in the important of the strong institutions in maintaining peace and security as well as advancing the effective role of intergovernmental organizations. Although the roles of social and economic institutions are vital, the roles of political institutions have become more vital in showcasing the important of politics in the lives of mankind. As remarked by Aristotle; politics is a master science, particularly, political institutions are essential ingredients of politics and they must be respected by all human beings (Armand, 2016). Because of their roles in the state, political institutions deserve scrutiny to discern their functions in any state. Thus, what are political institutions? Why studying political institutions? What political systems are there? What is parliamentary system of the government? What is presidential system of the government? What is the role of the office of the president? These questions shall be attempted in this paper. The paper is

organized as well: section one introduces the question. Section two defines political institutions. Section three discusses the important of studying political institutions. Section four discusses political systems in the context of parliamentary, presidential and hybrid systems in global reflections. Section five concludes the study.

1.Laying the ground: defining political institutions:

Political institutions refer to both the formal organs as well as informal structures, which bear upon deliberation and decision-making, the former including the government, the parliament, the courts, and the administrative staff and the latter including constituencies and regions (Riak, 2023). Institutions refer to rules, procedures, systems, policies, regulations and laws that work in constraint in a polity (Common, 2002).Political institutions are social instrumentalities for the attainment of community goals. While informal institutions exert great influence on decision-making through such input functions as political socialization, communication, interest-articulation and interest aggregations, they also exert their influences through the formal organs and structures that the output functions (Riak, 2021). These decisions are officially formulated, expressed and realized or emphasis will be on the formal structures of political institutions. The familiar structures within political systems include: interest groups, political parties, legislatures,

executives, bureaucracies and courts. Countries have these political institutions but they are not only organized differently, they function very differently indeed. Thus, institution by institution comparisons must spell out functions in detail before it can bring us toward understanding the important similarities and differences in the politics of these countries. It is when we separate structure or institution from function and trace these activities through the inputs, the conversion process and outputs of the political system that we can arrive at a judgment of the significance of the various political institutions. Bingham Powell (1988) assert that only when we start to ask questions about the process and performance then we can attach meaning to structural characteristics (Powell, 1988). It is when we come to the point that we can say specific institutions perform specific functions with specific consequences does our comparative analysis begin to make some sense.

2. Why study political institutions?: In the political context, institutions are primarily organizations. It is necessary to state that institutions and ideologies operate political systems. However, there are some institutions and structures that play leading roles in the formulation of public policy. According to John Loewestern (1965), institutions are the apparatus through which the power process functions in a society organized as a state (Loewestern, 1965). The dynamics of politics, that is, decision-making is constituted by the interplay between social organs. In addition, institutional comparison focuses on the way legal authority is distributed among these institutions in accordance with constitutional principles and other statutory provisions. What are the powers of the President of the United States vis-à-vis the Congress? What is the legal authority of the British House of Commons and House of Lords? What are the express legal powers of the Presidents of France, Germany, Russia, Mexico and South Africa? And above all, why do states distribute legal authority the way they do? In most countries the legal competence of the leading governmental institutions is spelled out in their constitutions (Riak, 2021). The legislatures, the world over, irrespective of whether they are operating in the developed democracies or the industrialized states or found in the developing countries are generally perceived to have declined in terms of their ability to efficiently and realistically perform the roles with which they are often associated with in the modern states. However, while most scholars believe that the legislatures have declined in performance, there are some scholars who still stick to the position that the realities of the complex socio-economic and political environment are clearly visible. Whereas the legislatures don't only support transformational roles, they also have great involvement of different assemblies in the policy-making activities of the different States of the world (Blondel, 1969).

This development is, indeed, a contradiction largely because the representative assembly is believed to symbolize the peoples' sovereignty. In fact, Margaret Davies (1996) noted that democracy loses its essence and becomes meaningless without the existence of a viable, functional and potent legislature (Davies, 1969). Scholars like Jean Blondel (1969) are of the view that most other scholars are having a wrong notion of what legislatures should do and what they actually do (Blondel, 1969). To Blondel, this wrong notion arises from the fact that there is a huge expression from the public that the legislatures should be at the vanguard of public policy making. By this, they are bereft of the knowledge of the constraint that

the operating environment, characterized by the high level of complexity and technicality is imposed on the legislatures. Consequently, rather than restricting themselves to law-making, modern assemblies are often deeply involved in scrutiny and oversight of the activities of the administration. The degrees to which the assemblies are involved in the affairs of their respective states also vary significantly. Mary Douglas and Aron Wildavsky vision the role of institutions as problem-simplifying devices arguing that individuals delegate their decision-making processes to the institutions (Douglas and Wildavsky, 2014). Hence, for Douglas and Wildavsky institutions would succeed when they are based on established structures. However, Pierre Bourdieu argues that institutions would succeed when they are based on practice (Bourdieu, 2000). A brief explanation on institutions and particularly political institutions is necessary. In doing this, it is important to examine both the parliamentary and presidential systems of government.

3. Types of political systems

3.1. Parliamentary system of government: A parliamentary system is a system of government wherein the ministers of the executive branch are drawn from the legislature, and are accountable to that body, such that the executive and legislative branches are intertwined. In such a system, the head of government is both *de facto* chief executive and chief legislator. Parliamentary systems are characterized by no clear-cut separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches, leading to a different set of checks and balances compared to those found in presidential systems (Riak, 2023). Parliamentary systems usually have a clear differentiation between the head of government and the head of state, with the head of government being the prime minister or premier, and the head of state often being a figurehead, often either a president (elected either popularly or by the parliament) or a hereditary monarch (often in a constitutional monarchy). A parliamentary system may consist of two styles of chambers of parliament, one with two chambers (or houses): an elected lower house, and an upper house or senate which may be appointed or elected by a different mechanism from the lower house (Armand et al, 2016). This style of two houses is called bicameral system. Legislatures with only one house are known as unicameral system. The parliamentary system does not mean that different parties in coalition with each other rule a country. Such multiparty arrangements are usually the product of an electoral system known as proportional representation. Many parliamentary countries, especially those that use "first past the post" voting, have governments composed of one party. However, parliamentary systems in continental Europe do use proportional representation, and tend to produce election results in which no single party has a majority of seats. Proportional representation in a non-parliamentary system doesn't have this result (Arguelles, 2009). Parliamentarianism may also be for governance in local governments. An example is the city of Oslo, which has an executive council as a part of the parliamentary system. The council manager system of municipal government used in some U.S. cities bears many similarities to a parliamentary system. Arend Lijphart (2009) divides parliamentary democracies into two different systems: the Westminster and consensus systems (Lijphart, 2009).

3.1.1. The Westminster model:: The Westminster Palace in London, United Kingdom originates from the British Houses

of Parliament. Today, the Westminster system is found in many Commonwealths of Nations countries, although they are neither universal within nor exclusive to Commonwealth countries. These parliaments tend to have a more adversarial style of debate and the plenary session of parliament is relatively more important than committees. Some parliaments in this model are elected using a plurality voting system (first past the post), such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and India, while others use proportional representation, such as Ireland and New Zealand (Riak, 2021). The Australian House of Representatives is elected using instant-runoff voting while the Senate is elected using proportional representation through single transferable vote. Even when proportional representation systems are used, the voting systems tend to allow the voter to vote for a named candidate rather than a party list. This model does allow for a greater separation of powers than the Western European model, since the governing party will often not have a majority in the upper house. However, parliamentary systems still feature a lesser separation of powers than is found in democratic presidential systems. Government in a parliamentary system of the Westminster model is based on the fact that those who constitute the cabinet are drawn from the legislature. Indeed, the chief executive, that is, the head of cabinet, who is the prime minister, is not elected on the strength of popular votes of the public. The prime minister is chosen on the grounds that he is the leader of the party with majority seats in parliament (Riak, 2023).

What this translates into is that members of the cabinet are drawn from the assembly and also retain their seats as legislators while serving as ministers. This underlines the doctrine of fusion of power commonly associated with the parliamentary system. Largely because members of the cabinet are drawn from and remain members of the legislature, the continual support of the assembly is needed for the government to continue in office (Landman, 2008). The government will cease to exist if it receives a "negative vote", that is, when a vote of no confidence is passed on the government, the government is forced to resign. But the government may dissolve the assembly in turn. However, because of the enormous cost to be paid, particularly by the majority party in parliament, if dissolution takes place, it is a dormant instrument that the house does not apply. The legislature in the parliamentary system appears much weaker than the legislature in the presidential democracy. This is so because, the survival of the cabinet and government depends on the support of the assembly, hence high party discipline ensures that legislatures elected on the platform of the ruling party exercise less independence during voting on issues in the house. Members of the ruling party in a parliamentary democracy are subordinated to high party control, such as is not common or seen in the presidential arrangement. The laws passed by the entire parliament cannot be reversed or set aside by any Court in the land. This is why it is said that the Westminster parliament is the most powerful in terms of lawmaking. By this, parliamentary legislation is not subject to judiciary review. This contrasts with the practice in most presidential democracies where judicial review is a critical component of the constitutional framework. The only seeming check on parliamentary power is the power of veto of the King, which is rarely applied. On the other hand, the House of Lords may exercise its power of suspense veto, but such veto is vacated after six months. Thus, the Commons can have its suspended laws passed after the suspense veto lapses. This

contrast with the presidential system where the concurrence of the two chambers is required before any bills becomes law. If any of the houses decide not to consider a bill already passed by the other, the bill dies. The British parliament is primarily established on dual institutions. The first being the two-chamber legislature while the second is the cabinet. According to Paul Appadorai (1968), the cabinet is real, as distinguished, from the nominal executive in Britain (Appadorai, 1968). What this suggests is that those members drawn from the legislature constitute the real cabinet while the queen or the King, who by inheritance occupies the executive office, is the nominal. Indeed, the power of the executive is believed to be exercised by the cabinet on behalf of the crown. This perhaps explains why the cabinet is taken to be a body of royal advisers chosen by the prime minister in the name of the crown with the tacit approval of the House of Commons. It is important to point out that for King in Parliament, the House of Lords and the House of Commons, constitutes the law-making body in Britain unlike the American presidential model, the parliamentary model is a system where the party that receives or wins the highest seats in parliament forms government (Riak, 2021). However, in situation where no party receives the majority votes required to form government, coalition of parties will be required to form a government. However, when a coalition is formed by parties with incongruent ideologies and interests, this may result to the frequent dissolution of the government. The system in such an operational environment will become unstable. No case justifies this better than the French fourth republic when on average a government stayed in office for six months before dissolution results from the collapsed coalition. Examples of countries with pure parliamentary system where there exists mutual dependence between executive and legislature include the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Italy, Iceland and Denmark (Landman, 2008). In these countries, the executive depends on the confidence of the majority (or coalition) in the legislature; the executive can dissolve the legislature (usually in conjunction with the head of state) and lastly no separate elections are needed for each executive and legislature. In the UK, the court is to some extent not too separate from the legislature and the cabinet. This is largely because members of the legislature are chosen to form a cabinet. Yet, every member of cabinet is an automatic member of the Privy Council (Appadorai, 1968). However, not all members of the Privy Council are members of cabinet. This is so because former cabinet members remain members of Privy Council for life. The Privy Council is an appellate court and is the highest court in Britain.

3.1.2. The consensus system: Some Western European parliamentary models (e.g., Spain and Germany) tend to have a more consensual debating system and have semi-cyclical debating chambers. Consensus systems are identified by proportional representation, where there is more of a tendency to use party list systems than the Westminster model legislatures. The committees of these Parliaments tend to be more important than the plenary chamber. This model is sometimes called the West German Model since the earliest exemplar in its final form was in the Bundestag of West Germany (which became the Bundestag of Germany upon the absorption of the Germany Democratic Republic by the Federal Republic of Germany). Switzerland is considered one of the purest examples of a consensus system (Loewestern, 1965). There also exists a hybrid model, the semi-presidential system, drawing on both presidential systems and

parliamentary systems. For example, the French Fifth Republic. Much of Eastern Europe has adopted this model since the early 1990s. Implementations of the parliamentary system can also differ on whether the government needs the explicit approval of the parliament to form, rather than just the absence of its disapproval, and under what conditions (if any) the government has the right to dissolve the parliament, like Jamaica and many others. Most of the developing countries inherited the parliamentary arrangement bequeath to them at independence by their formal colonial administrations. But the parliamentary arrangement was largely assaulted and dismantled by the Africans who took over political power at independence. The system of parliamentary democracy adopted by the seventeen former British African countries with the exception of Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe. Benjamin Nwabueze (2004) describes the Westminster export mode and argues that this model was a by-product of the reform introduced to make the system reflects local realities of the respective states (Nwabueze, 2004). Thus, as opposed to the typical Westminster or parliamentary tradition of Britain, the inherited parliamentary system in the African states is characterized by:

- The justifiability of relations between organs of the executive and the judicial review of the constitutionality of actions of government, particularly legislative acts;
- The separation of executive and judicial power (as distinct from their personnel) from legislative power. The Constitution is supreme;
- A plural executive but the two executives are politicians unlike in Britain where one is monarch. The system is of plural executive, because the ministers are equal in powers, with the prime ministers as mere *primus inter pares*. But the prime minister gains pre-eminence by the fact that he forms government and presides over the cabinet;
- The power to make legislation jointly vested in both the legislature and the head of state; and
- The prime minister and other ministers are members of the legislative assembly. The prime minister is the leader of the majority party (Davies, 1996).

However, the parliamentary arrangement inherited by these states collapsed shortly after political independence. The collapse of the parliamentary democracy due to one form of authoritarian party government or transformation to a presidential model was explained away by Adedeji Adebayo (1986) as a mere consequence of the unsuitability of the parliamentary model to a complex, heterogeneous and divided societies as those upon which the system was imposed in Africa (Adebayo, 1986). The argument then was that the imposition of a dual executive was alien to African tradition where only one person was always recognized as the paramount ruler. Thus, a power tussle or contest between two clashing personalities was alien to Africa. This explains the transformation from the parliamentary model to one form of presidentialism. The survival of the parliamentary system in most countries of Europe may therefore be attributed to the history of an age-long practice in those countries.

Advantages of the parliamentary system: One of the commonly attributed advantages of parliamentary systems is that it's faster and easier to pass legislation. This is because the executive branch is dependent upon the direct or indirect support of the legislative branch and often includes members of the legislature. Thus, this would amount to the executive (as

the majority party or coalition of parties in the legislature) possessing more votes in order to pass legislation. In a presidential system, the executive is often chosen independently from the legislature (Riak, 2023). If the executive and legislature in such a system include members entirely or predominantly from different political parties, then stalemate can occur. Former US President Bill Clinton often faced problems in this regard, since the Republicans used to control Congress for much of his tenure. Accordingly, the executive within a presidential system might not be able to properly implement his or her platform/manifesto. Evidently, an executive in any system (be it parliamentary, presidential or semi-presidential) is chiefly voted into office on the basis of his or her party's platform/manifesto. It could be said then that the will of the people is more easily instituted within a parliamentary system. In addition to quicker legislative action, parliamentarianism has attractive features for nations that are ethnically, racially, or ideologically divided. In a unipersonal presidential system, all executive power is concentrated on the president. In a parliamentary system, with a collegial executive, power is more divided. In the 1989 Lebanese Taif Agreement, in order to give Muslims greater political power, Lebanon moved from a semi-presidential system with a strong president to a system more structurally similar to a classical parliamentarianism. Iraq similarly disdained a presidential system out of fears that such a system would be tantamount to Shiite domination; Afghanistan's minorities refuse to go along with a presidency as strong as the Pashtuns desired. Some scholars have also argued that power is more evenly spread out in the power structure of parliamentarianism. To this school of thought, the premier seldom tends to have as high importance as a ruling president, and there tends to be a higher focus on voting for a party and its political ideas than voting for an actual person. For instance, Walter Bagehot (2010) praised parliamentarianism for producing serious debates, for allowing the change in power without an election, and for allowing elections at any time (Bagehot, 2010). Bagehot considered the four-year election rule of the United States to be unnatural (Ibid). There is also a body of scholarship, associated with Juan Linz, Fred Riggs, Bruce Ackerman, and Robert Dahl that claims that parliamentarianism is less prone to authoritarian collapse. These scholars point out that since the Second World War two-thirds of Third World countries establishing parliamentary governments successfully made the transition to democracy. By contrast, they argue, no Third World presidential system successfully made the transition to democracy without experiencing coups and other constitutional breakdowns. As Bruce Ackerman (2013) says of the thirty countries to have experimented with American checks and balances and thus all of them, without exception, have succumbed to the nightmare (of breakdown) one time or another, often repeatedly (Ackerman, 2013).

Disadvantages of parliamentary system: One main criticism of many parliamentary systems is that the head of government is in almost all cases not directly elected. In a presidential system, the president is usually chosen directly by the electorate, or by a set of electors directly chosen by the people, separate from the legislature. However, in a parliamentary system the Prime Minister is elected by the legislature, often under the strong influence of the party leadership. Thus, a party's candidate for the head of government is usually known before the election, possibly making the election as much about the person as the party behind him or her. Another major criticism of the parliamentary system lies precisely in its

purported advantage: that there is no truly independent body to oppose and veto legislation passed by the parliament, and therefore no substantial check on legislative power (Arguelles, 2009). Conversely, because of the lack of inherent separation of powers, some believe that a parliamentary system can place too much power in the executive entity, leading to the feeling that the legislature or judiciary has little scope to administer checks or balances on the executive. However, parliamentary systems may be bicameral, with an upper house designed to check the power of the lower (from which the executive comes). Although, it is possible to have a powerful prime minister, as Britain has, or even a dominant party system, as Japan has, parliamentary systems are also sometimes unstable. Critics point to Israel, Italy, Canada, the French Fourth Republic, and Weimar Germany as examples of parliamentary systems where unstable coalitions, demanding minority parties, votes of no confidence, and threats of such votes, make or have made effective governance impossible. Defenders of parliamentarianism say that parliamentary instability is the result of proportional representation, political culture, and highly polarized electorates. Former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi criticized the parliamentary system of Iraq, saying that because of party-based voting the vast majority of the electorate based their choices on sectarian and ethnic affiliations, not on genuine political platforms.

Also, for allowing an election to take place at any time, without a definite election calendar, it has been pointed out that the Parliamentary system can indeed be abused. In some systems, such as in UK, a ruling party can schedule elections when it feels that it is likely to do well, and so avoid elections at times of unpopularity (Riak, 2023). Thus, by careful timing of elections, in a parliamentary system a party can extend its rule for longer than is feasible in a functioning presidential system. This problem can be alleviated somewhat by setting fixed dates for parliamentary elections, as is the case in several of Australia's state parliaments. In other systems, such as the Dutch and the Belgian, the ruling party or coalition has some flexibility in determining the election date. Also, critics of parliamentary systems point out that people with significant popular support in the community are prevented from becoming Prime Minister if they cannot get elected to parliament since there is no option to run for Prime Minister like one can run for president under a presidential system. Additionally, prime ministers may lose their positions solely because they lose their seats in Parliament, even though they may still be popular nationally. However, proponents of the Parliamentary system have argued that as members of parliament, prime ministers are elected firstly to represent their electoral constituents and if they lose their support then consequently, they are no longer entitled to be prime minister (Blondel, 1969).

3.2. Presidential system of government: A presidential system is a system of government where an executive branch exists and presides (hence the name) separately from the legislature, to which it is not accountable and which cannot, in normal circumstances, dismiss it. It owes its origins to the medieval monarchies of France, England and Scotland in which executive authority was vested in the Crown, not in meetings of the estates of the realm (i.e., Parliament): the Estates-General of France, the Parliament of England or the Estates of Scotland. The concept of separate spheres of influence of the executive and legislature was emulated in the Constitution of the United States, with the creation of the

office of the President of the United States. In England and Scotland (since 1707 as the Kingdom of Great Britain, and since 1801 as the United Kingdom) the power of a separate executive waned to a ceremonial role and a new executive, answerable to parliament, evolved while the power of the United States separated executive increased. This has given rise to criticism of the United States presidency as an "imperial presidency" though some analysts dispute the existence of an absolute separation, referring to the concept of "separate Institutions sharing power". Although not exclusive to republics, and applied in the case of semi-constitutional monarchies where a monarch exercises power (both as head of state and chief of the executive branch of government) alongside a legislature, the term is often associated with republican systems in the Americas. The defining characteristic of a Republican presidential system is how the executive is elected, but nearly all presidential systems share the following features:

- The president has a fixed term of office. Elections are held at scheduled times and cannot be triggered by a vote of no confidence or other such parliamentary procedures. In some countries, there is an exception to this rule, which provides for the removal of a president in the event that he/she is found to have broken a law.
- The executive branch is unipersonal. Members of the cabinet serve at the pleasure of the president and must carry out the policies of the executive and legislative branches. However, presidential systems frequently require legislative approval of presidential nominations to the cabinet as well as various governmental posts such as judges. A president generally has the power to direct members of the cabinet, military or any officer or employee of the executive branch, but generally has no power to dismiss or give orders to judges.
- The power to pardon or commute sentences of convicted criminals is often in the hands of the heads of state in governments that separate their legislative and executive branches of government.

3.2.1. The office of the president: This is the highest office in the country. It must be noted that countries that feature a presidential system of government are not the exclusive users of the title of President or the republican form of government. For example, a dictator, who may or may not have been popularly or legitimately elected maybe and often is called a President. Likewise, many parliamentary democracies are republics and have Presidents, but this position is largely ceremonial; notable examples include Germany, India, Ireland, Israel and Ethiopia (Landman, 2018). Some national Presidents are "figureheads" heads of state, like constitutional monarchs, and not active executive heads of government. In contrast, in a full-fledged presidential system, a President is chosen by the people to be the head of the executive branch. Presidential governments make no distinction between the positions of head of state and head of government, both of which are held by the President. Most parliamentary governments have a symbolic head of state in the form of a President or Monarch. That person is responsible for the formalities of state functions as the figurehead while the Prime Minister generally exercises the constitutional prerogatives of the head of government. Such figurehead presidents tend to be elected in a much less direct manner than active presidential systems, some are for example, elected by a vote of the legislature. A few nations, such as Ireland, do have a popularly

elected ceremonial, president. A few countries (e.g., South Africa) have powerful presidents who are elected by the legislature. Countries with a pure presidential system are Kenya and USA; however, South Sudan has semi-presidential system of government. These presidents are chosen in the same way as a prime minister, yet are heads of both state and government. These executives are titled “presidents”, but are in practice similar to prime ministers. Other countries with the same system include Botswana, the Marshall Islands, and Nauru. In the United States of America, the method of a legislative vote for president was a part of Madison's Virginia Plan and was seriously considered by the framers of the American Constitution (Davies, 1996). Presidents in presidential systems are always active participants in the political process, though the extent of their relative power may be influenced by the political makeup of the legislature and whether their supporters or opponents have the dominant position therein. In some presidential systems such as Uganda, Weimar Germany, South Korea or the Republic of China (or Taiwan), there is an office of prime minister or premier but, unlike in semi-presidential or parliamentary systems, the Premier is responsible to the president rather than to the legislature.

The features of the presidential executive: The chief executive or the president in the presidential democracy is mostly popularly elected. According to Gabriel Almond (2007), the American president is elected indirectly by the Electoral College (though actually by indirect popular) for a four-year term (Almond, 2007). The president may be from a party other than the party controlling the majority of seats in the legislature. This cannot happen in a parliamentary democracy where the leading party or coalition of parties with majority seats forms the government. When the president emerges from a party different from the one controlling the legislature, what results is called a “divided” government. The executive is separately elected and hence not a member of the legislature. The president is however elected to a fixed term. The president can only be reelected once. The president cannot dissolve the assembly but the assembly can impeach the president, if found to have abused his oath of office (Riak, 2023). The presidential system has a single executive; hence executive power is not shared between separate persons. The legislature is separated from the executive organ. No member of the legislature can serve in the executive office unless and until he has resigned his or her position in the legislature. The lower chamber is always much larger and representative than the upper chamber. However, unlike the British House of Lords, the membership of the upper chamber is always by election. Legislators are elected into a specified term of office. But in most presidential democracies, no limit is imposed on the number of time that legislators may be reelected. The judiciary, manned largely by distinct personnel, is vested with the power of adjudication. However, unlike the constraint on the judiciary in the British model where no court can review any laws made by the assembly, in the American presidential model, the laws made by the legislature are subjected to judicial review. If such laws are found to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the laws become null and void. As Gabriel Almond (2007) argue, the Supreme Court, through its power of judicial review, can declare any act of the President or Congress null and void on the ground that it violates the Constitution (Almond, 2007). However, the extent to which a nation’s judiciary is free to perform its roles, and efficiently too, may depend on how developed and rooted democracy is in

the state. For instance, the experience from Latin America shows that in states that are just emerging from one form of an authoritarian regime or the other, the judiciary is usually not too strong and often incapable of fully asserting its authority. This fact was demonstrated also in Nigeria, another developing African country, where the executive flagrantly violated judicial orders with impunity after Nigeria returned to democratic governance after nearly fifteen years of military dictatorship. Although the presidential system is largely believed and accepted to have emerged on the global political scene consequent on the adoption and the design of the American Constitution of 1778, the principles inherent in the model have been accepted and practiced by most other modern states, particularly countries in the developing world. As Newton VonDeth (2005) notes, influenced by the USA, many Central and South American democracies have presidential governments (VonDeth, 2005). The countries, which have the system, include Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. Apart from the countries in Latin America, a good number of countries in Africa have settled for the presidential system. These countries include Niger, Benin, Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria and Kenya (VonDeth, 2005).

However, one important point to note about some of the developing countries which practice the presidential democracy is that despite predicting the system on the principles of power dispersion and checks and balances, the legislatures are most often too weak to check the executive. Gibbs Helmke (2002), particularly, notes that despite the in-built checks and balances characterizing the presidential system, the separation of power in Latin America is so notoriously weak and the executive holds enormous power in governance (Helmke, 2002). The president is so strong in the Niger Republic that he can dissolve the legislature and this was demonstrated in the dissolution of the assembly in Niger in August 2009. The Niger Republic Constitution was designed to subordinate the legislature to the executive in both law and policy making. The presidential system operational in Nigeria is different from the one that collapsed in Niger because the legislature in Nigeria has been equipped with sufficient power to check undue executive encroachment. The President of Niger operated with little restraint on his authority. This made him completely dominate the legislative and judiciary branches. In South Sudan, the President is so strong in that he can declare a state of emergency, dissolve the legislature and declare war (Riak, 2023).

3.3. Hybrid system of government: This is a model that combine the features of parliamentary and presidential systems of government. This model has its origin in the Fifth Republic Constitution of France and it is characterized by a fair blend of the features of both the parliamentary and presidential systems (Ackerman, 2013). One of the major features of the model is that the executive is elected by the people into a fixed term of office. Thus, the legitimacy of the authority exercised by the president flows from the consent given in a popular election. However, unlike the presidential arrangement, a prime minister selected from the majority party or coalition of parties in parliament work alongside the directly elected president. European examples of this model are found in France and Portugal. Under the model, federal ministers are selected from the legislature. However, where individuals that are not members of the legislature are selected or appointed as ministers, they are required to seek election in subsequent

elections (Almond, 2007). The President under the French model is more powerful than the executive under the pure presidential system of the US and Nigeria. The President of France can impose his/her will on the assembly and make it to pass legislation through the constitutional court. The French constitution vested in the president, temporary power of dictatorship when it appears that the republic or sovereignty of the state is under threat, as well as when the functioning of public authority is interrupted (Vondeth, 2005). The president has certain power exclusively while he shares some power with the prime minister. Also, the Parliament of France consists of two houses, the Senate and the National Assembly. The Senate is elected by indirect suffrage. The Senate is seen as representing local authorities and also constitutes the territorial assemblies of the republic. The National Assembly is directly elected by adult suffrage. For the Judiciary, the Fifth Republic constitution of France also declares that the President of the republic is the guarantor of judicial independence and authority. He is assisted by the Superior Council of the Judiciary consisting of the minister of justice and nine others nominated by the president; the council is presided over by the president of the republic. This political configuration seen in the semi-presidential system clearly undermines the principle of separation of power and in fact concentrated more power in the executive than any other organ of government (Riak, 2021).

3.4.Mixed systems in developing societies: Different versions of the parliamentary-presidential mix have been adopted in the developing democracies. For instance, in Ghana, while the president is popularly elected, the bulk of the members of the cabinet are appointed from the elected members of the assembly. Unlike France, however, judicial review of the constitutionality of the actions and pronouncement of the assembly and the executive could be undertaken by the Ghanaian judiciary. In South Africa where a model close to that of Ghana is operated also, the president is elected or selected from the majority party in the lower chamber. The president is chosen from the National Assembly. Similarly, the members of the cabinet are selected from the legislature.

Advantages of the presidential system of government: Generally, four basic advantages of the presidential system could be outlined in every system where it is practiced. They include:

I.Direct mandate: In a presidential system, the president is often elected directly by the people. To some, this makes the president's power more legitimate than that of a leader appointed indirectly. In the United States, the president is elected neither directly nor through the legislature, but by an electoral college. A prime minister is usually chosen by a majority of the people's representatives, while a president is usually chosen directly by the people. According to supporters of the presidential system, a popularly elected leadership is inherently more democratic than a leadership chosen by a legislative body, even if the legislative body was itself elected, to rule (Arguelles, 2009). By making more than one electoral choice, voters in a presidential system can more accurately indicate their policy preferences. For example, in the United States of America, some political scientists interpret the late Cold War tendency to elect a Democratic Congress and a Republican President as the choice for a Republican foreign policy and a Democratic domestic policy. It is also stated that the direct mandate of a president makes him or her more

accountable. The reasoning behind this argument is that a prime minister is "shielded" from public opinion by the apparatus of the state, being several steps removed. Critics of this view note, however, that presidents cannot typically be removed from power when their policies no longer reflect the wishes of the citizenry. In the United States, presidents can only be removed by an impeachment trial for high crimes and misdemeanors, whereas prime ministers can typically be removed if they fail a motion of confidence in their government.

II.Separation of powers: A presidential system establishes the presidency and the legislature as two parallel structures. Supporters claim that this arrangement allows each structure to supervise the other, preventing abuses. The fact that a presidential system separates the executive from the legislature is sometimes held up as an advantage, in that each branch may scrutinize the actions of the other. In a parliamentary system, the executive is drawn from the legislature, making criticism of one by the other considerably less likely. A formal condemnation of the executive by the legislature is often regarded to be a vote of no confidence (Davies, 1996). According to supporters of the presidential system, the lack of checks and balances means that misconduct by a prime minister may never be discovered.

Critics respond that if the president's party controls a presidential system's legislature, the same situation exists. Proponents note that even in such a situation a legislator from the president's party is in a better position to criticize the president or his policies should he deem it necessary, since a president is immune to the effects of a motion of no confidence (Davies, 1996). In parliamentary systems, party discipline is much more strictly enforced. If a parliamentary backbencher publicly criticizes the executive or its policies to any significant extent then he/she faces a much higher prospect of losing his/her party's nomination, or even outright expulsion from the party. Despite the existence of the no-confidence vote, in practice, it is extremely difficult to stop a prime minister or cabinet that has made its decision. In a parliamentary system, if important legislation proposed by the incumbent prime minister and his cabinet is "voted down" by a majority of the members of parliament then it is considered to be a vote of no-confidence. The incumbent government must then either resign or call elections to be held, a consequence few backbenchers are willing to endure. Hence, a no confidence vote in some parliamentary countries, like Britain, only occurs a few times in a century.

III.Speed and decisiveness: Some argue that a president with strong powers can usually enact changes quickly. However, others argue that the separation of powers slows the system down. Also, some proponents of the presidential system claim that the system can respond more rapidly to emerging situations than to parliamentary ones (Riak, 2023). A prime minister, when taking action, needs to retain the support of the legislature, but a president is often less constrained. Other supporters of presidential systems sometimes argue in the exact opposite direction, however, saying that presidential systems can slow decision-making to beneficial ends. Divided government, where different parties control the presidency and the legislature, is said to restrain the excesses of both parties, and guarantee bipartisan input into legislation. In South Sudan, the president uses decrees in appointing and firing government

constitutional holders using article 101 of the constitution. It has been quite speedy in that he appoints and revokes the same day.

IV.Stability: A president, by virtue of a fixed term, may provide more stability than a prime minister who can be dismissed at any time (Loewestern, 1965). Although most parliamentary governments go long periods without a no-confidence vote, Italy, Israel, and the French Fourth Republic have all experienced difficulties maintaining stability. When parliamentary systems have multiple parties and governments are forced to rely on coalitions, as they do in nation-states that use a system of proportional representation, extremist parties can theoretically use the threat of leaving a coalition to further their agendas (Arguelles, 2009). Many people consider presidential systems to be more able to survive emergencies. A country under enormous stress may, supporters argue, be better off being led by a president with a fixed term than rotating premierships. France during the Algerian controversy switched to a semi-presidential system as did Sri Lanka during its civil war, while Israel experimented with a directly elected prime minister in 1992. In France and Sri Lanka, the results are widely considered to have been positive. However, in the case of Israel, an unprecedented proliferation of smaller parties occurred-leading to the restoration of the previous system of selecting a prime minister. The fact that elections are fixed in a presidential system is considered to be a welcome "check" on the powers of the executive, contrasting parliamentary systems, which often allow the prime minister to call elections whenever he sees fit, or orchestrate his own vote of no confidence to trigger an election when he cannot get a legislative item passed. The presidential model is said to discourage this sort of opportunism, and instead force the executive to operate within the confines of a term he cannot alter to suit his own needs. Theoretically, if a president's positions and actions have had a positive impact on their respective country, then it is likely that their party's candidate (possibly they) will be elected for another term in office.

Disadvantages of the presidential system of government: Generally, three basic disadvantages of the presidential system have been identified by scholars. They are:

I.Tendency towards authoritarianism: Winning the presidency is a winner-take-all, zero-sum prize. A prime minister who does not enjoy a majority in the legislature will have to either form a coalition or, if he is able to lead a minority government, govern in a manner acceptable to at least some of the opposition parties. Even if the prime minister leads a majority government, he must still govern within (perhaps unwritten) constraints as determined by the members of his party - a premier in this situation is often at greater risk of losing his party leadership than his party is at risk of losing the next election. On the other hand, once elected a president can not only marginalize the influence of other parties, but can exclude rival factions in his own party as well, or even leave the party whose ticket he was elected under. The president can thus rule without any allies for the duration of one or possibly multiple terms, a worrisome situation for many interest groups. Juan Linz and Stephen Andrew (1996) argue as follows:

The danger that zero-sum presidential elections pose is compounded by the rigidity of the president's fixed term in office. Winners and losers are sharply defined for the entire period of the presidential mandate... losers must wait four or five years without any access to executive power and

patronage. The zero-sum game in presidential regimes raises the stakes of presidential elections and inevitably exacerbates their attendant tension and polarization. Constitutions that only require plurality support are said to be especially undesirable, as significant power can be vested in a person who does not enjoy support from a majority of the population. Some political scientists go further, and argue that presidential systems have difficulty sustaining democratic practices, noting that presidentialism has slipped into authoritarianism in many of the countries in which it has been implemented (Linz & Stephen, 1996). Seymour Lipset et al (1955) are careful to point out that this has taken place in political cultures not conducive to democracy and that militaries have tended to play a prominent role in most of these countries (Lipset, et al, 1955). Nevertheless, certain aspects of the presidential system may have played a role in some situations. In a presidential system, the legislature and the president have equally valid mandates from the public. There is often no way to the reconcile conflict between the branches of government. When the president and legislature are in disagreement and the government is not working effectively, there is a powerful incentive to employ extra-constitutional maneuvers to break the deadlock. Ecuador is sometimes presented as a case study of democratic failures over the past quarter-century. Presidents have ignored the legislature or bypassed it altogether. Once president had the National Assembly tear-gassed, while paratroopers kidnapped another who agreed to certain congressional demands.

From 1979 through 1988, Ecuador staggered through a succession of executive-legislative confrontations that created a near-permanent crisis atmosphere in the policy. In 1984, president León Febres Cordero tried to physically bar new congressionally appointed Supreme Court appointees from taking their seats. In Brazil, presidents have accomplished their objectives by creating executive agencies over which Congress had no say. It should be noted that this alleged authoritarian tendency is often best seen in unitary states that have presidential systems. Federal states, with multiple states (or provincial) governments that are semi-sovereign, provide additional checks on authoritarian tendencies. This can be seen in the United States, where there are fifty states, each semi-sovereign, each having its own three branch elected government (governor, legislature, and court system), police, emergency response system, and military force. If an extreme extra-constitutional action, such as the president dissolving Congress, occurred within the Federal government of the United States, it would not necessarily result in the president being able to rule dictatorially since he or she would have to deal with the fifty state governments.

II.Separation of powers: Even though it has been acknowledged as an instrument of check and balance, critics of the presidential system believe that the system does not offer voters the kind of accountability seen in parliamentary systems. It is easy for either the president or Congress to escape blame by blaming the other. Describing the United States, for instance, former Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillon said the president blames Congress, the Congress blames the president, and the public remains confused and disgusted with government in Washington DC (Ackerman, 2013). But appropriate constitutional safeguards, especially in terms of adequate provisions that spell out the powers, duties

and obligations of each of these institutions or offices is a way out of such lacuna, where it indeed exists.

III. Impediments to leadership change: Another problem of presidentialism is that it is often difficult to remove a president from office early. The procedure is often long, arduous and cumbersome. In most countries, it is also marred by political colorations. Even if a president is proved to be inefficient, even if he becomes unpopular, even if his policy is unacceptable to the majority of his countrymen, he and his methods must be endured until the moment comes for a new election. Consider John Tyler, who only became president because William Henry Harrison had died after thirty days. Tyler refused to sign Whig legislation, was loathed by his nominal party, but remained firmly in control of the executive branch (Blondel, 1969). Since the legal way to remove an unpopular president is often unrealizable, many presidential countries have experienced military coups to remove a leader who is said to have lost his mandate. In parliamentary systems, unpopular leaders can be quickly removed by a vote of no confidence, a procedure which is reckoned to be a "pressure release valve" for political tension (Lijphart, 2009). Votes of no confidence are easier to achieve in minority government situations, but even if the unpopular leader heads a majority government, nonetheless, he is often in a far less secure position than a president. Removing a president through impeachment is a process mandated by the constitution and is usually made into a very difficult process. By comparison, the process of removing a party leader is governed by the (often much less formal) rules of the party in question.

Nearly all parties (including governing parties) have a relatively simple and straightforward process for removing their leaders. If a premier sustains a serious enough blow to his/her popularity and refuses to resign on his/her own prior to the next election, then members of his/her party face the prospect of losing their seats. So other prominent party members have a very strong incentive to initiate a leadership challenge in hopes of mitigating damage to the party. More often than not, a premier facing a serious challenge will resolve to save face by resigning before he/she is formally removed—Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's relinquishing of her premiership being a prominent example. Finally, many have criticized presidential systems for their alleged slowness in responding to their citizens' needs. Often, the checks and balances make action extremely difficult.

Walter Bagehot said of the American system the executive is crippled by not getting the law it needs, and the legislature is spoiled by having to act without responsibility: the executive becomes unfit for its name, since it cannot execute what it decides on; the legislature is demoralized by liberty, by taking decisions of others (and not itself) will suffer the effects (Bagehot, 2010). Defenders of presidential systems, on the other hand, hold that this can serve to ensure that minority wishes and rights are not trampled upon, thus preventing a "tyranny of the majority" and vice versa protecting the wishes and rights of the majority from abuse by the legislature and/or executive that holds a contrary view point, especially when there are frequent, scheduled elections. British-Irish philosopher and MP Edmund Burke stated that officials should be elected based on his (or her) unbiased opinion, his (or her) mature judgment, (and) his (or her) enlightened conscience and

therefore should reflect on the arguments for and against certain policies before taking positions and then act out on what an official would believe to be best in the long run for one's constituents and country as a whole even if it means short term backlash. Thus, defenders of presidential systems hold that sometimes what is wisest may not always be the most popular decision and vice versa.

3.5. Differences between parliamentary and presidential systems of government: A number of key theoretical differences exist between a presidential and a parliamentary system and they are discussed as follows:

I. The principle of presidential system: The central principle is that the legislative and executive branches of government should be separate. This leads to the separate election of a president, who is elected to office for a fixed term, and only removable for gross misdemeanor by impeachment and dismissal. In addition, he or she does not need to choose cabinet members commanding the support of the legislature. By contrast, in a parliamentary system, the executive branch is led by a council of ministers, headed by a Prime Minister, who is directly accountable to the legislature and often has their background in the legislature (regardless of whether it is called a "parliament", a "diet", or a "chamber") (Blondel, 1969). In parliamentary systems of government, the legislature is formally supreme and appoints a member from its house as the prime minister, which acts as the executive. In the separation of powers doctrine, the legislature in a presidential system is considered a power branch that is co-equal to and independent of the both judiciary and the executive. In addition to enacting laws, legislatures usually have exclusive authority to raise taxes and adopt the budget and other money bills.

II. President's set term of office: The legislature also exists for a set term of office and cannot be dissolved ahead of schedule in a presidential system. By contrast, in parliamentary systems, the legislature can typically be dissolved at any stage during its life by the head of state, usually on the advice of either the Prime Minister alone, by the Prime Minister and cabinet, or by the cabinet. The primary components of a legislature are one or more chambers or houses: assemblies that debate and vote upon bills. A legislature with only one house is called unicameral. A bicameral legislature possesses two separate chambers, usually described as an upper house and a lower house, which often differ in duties, powers, and the methods used for the selection of members. Much focus has been on tri-cameral legislatures; the most recent existed in the waning years of white-minority rule in South Africa.

III. In most parliamentary systems: The lower house is the more powerful house while the upper house is merely a chamber of advice or review. However, in presidential systems, the powers of the two houses are often similar or equal. In federations, it is typical for the upper house to represent the component states; the same applies to the supranational legislature of the European Union. For this purpose, the upper house may either contain the delegates of state governments, as is the case in the European Union and in Germany and was the case in the United States before 1913, or be elected according to a formula that grants equal representation to states with smaller populations, as is the case in Australia and the modern United States

IV. In a presidential system: The president usually has special privileges in the enactment of the legislation, namely, the possession of the power of veto over legislation of bills, in some cases subject to the power of the legislature by weighed majority to override the veto. However, it is extremely rare for the president to have the power to directly propose laws, or cast a vote on legislation. The legislature and the president are thus expected to serve as checks and balances on each other's powers.

V. Presidential system presidents: It may also be given a great deal of constitutional authority in the exercise of the office of Commander-in-Chief, a constitutional title given to most presidents. In addition, the presidential power to receive ambassadors as head of state is usually interpreted as giving the president broad powers to conduct foreign policy. Though semi-presidential systems may reduce a president's power over day-to-day government affairs, semi-presidential systems commonly give the president power over foreign policy.

VI. Presidential systems also have fewer ideological parties than parliamentary systems: Sometimes in the United States, the policies preferred by the two parties have been very similar. In some developing countries, differences between political parties are only in terms of personality, and perhaps the ethnic background of political parties, as elections are rarely fought or won on issues.

Overlapping elements of both parliamentary and presidential systems: However, in practice, elements of both systems overlap. Though a president in a presidential system does not have to choose a government answerable to the legislature, the legislature may have the right to scrutinize his or her appointments to high governmental office, with the right, on some occasions, to block an appointment. In the United States and Nigeria, for example, the Senate must confirm many appointments. By contrast, though answerable to parliament, a parliamentary system's cabinet may be able to make use of the parliamentary 'whip' (an obligation on party members in parliament to vote with their party) to control and dominate parliament, reducing parliament's ability to control the government. Some countries, such as France have similarly evolved to such a degree that they can no longer be accurately described as either presidential or parliamentary-style governments, and are instead grouped under the category of semi-presidential or hybrid.

3.6. Comparing the British and American systems (models): The presidential system of the United States and the parliamentary system of Britain share some characteristics and differ in many other respects. The two case studies are being assessed along the following parameters

I. The legislature: The primary purpose of a legislature in any constitutional democracy is to enact laws. However, the specific institutional environment in which this is done differs in a significant way from one type of system to another. In fact, the most fundamental difference is one of principle i.e., the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. This major principle distinguishes Britain from most other democratic countries. Parliament may enact any law it likes and no other body can set the law aside on the grounds that it is unconstitutional or undesirable. Conversely, the American system places the Constitution above even the congress. Despite these fundamental differences, certain functions performed by the legislative branches under both systems are

essentially the same, for example, either congressional or parliamentary approval is required to legitimize any new law. Also, both legislatures serve as forums in which political, economic, and social issues are debated. Both Congress and Parliament represent the true symbols of representative democracy.

II. Legislative independence: Although the powers of congress are limited by the Constitution, US legislatures have far more latitude than their British counterpart. Parliament is normally bicameral, but real legislature power is concentrated in the members of the House of Commons. The prime minister and cabinet usually do not make policy without first consulting influential MPs, and cabinet domination of parliament is strictly supported by party discipline. Congress presents an entirely different picture. Both its 435-member House and its 100-member Senate are powerful bodies whose consent is necessary before any measure can be enacted into law. In addition, representatives and senators tend to be locally oriented rather than national constituencies. They are elected to promote local interests and have the freedom to vote accordingly.

III. Legislative predictability: The greater independence called legislators under the presidential system makes Congress a much more unpredictable institution than its British counterpart. In Britain, a party that wins a national election by a clear mandate is presumed to have a popular mandate to carry out its campaign promises. Although disagreement may arise within the ranks of the governing party, the general tone and direction of the government are usually clear before Parliament. US election is different in many ramifications in this respect. Even in presidential election years when the presidency and vice-presidency, one-third of senate seats, and all House seats are contested, no clear national consensus may emerge. It is also possible that no legislative consensus will emerge, for instance, the newly elected president is not skilled in dealing with Congress. Generally speaking, legislative results from a give-and-take process involving both houses of Congress as well as the White House.

IV. Structural complexity: In Congress, there is a fragmentation of authority and power, which makes its structure notably more complex than that of the British Parliament. There are six significant standing committees in the entire House of Commons. These committees are not even specialized; their twenty to fifty members consider bills without reference to the subject matter. They lack the power to call hearings or solicit expert testimony, they cannot table a bill, and at best they can make technical adjustments in its language. In summary, committees' work in parliament is unexciting and uneventful. By contrast, the parliament committee system of the U.S congress has no less than fifteen specialized committees. These committees have a number of subcommittees, with each charged with even more specialized tasks. In addition, committees and subcommittees have the power to hold hearing and summon witnesses as part of routine investigations into executive branch programme and operations.

V. Watchdog role: The Congress performs a watchdog role, which takes various shapes. Policy reviews can occur at any point in the legislative process (during the authorization and appropriation phases of the budgetary process, for example, by means of investigations and hearings). The British parliamentary system stands in sharp contrast to this.

VI. The executive-legislative nexus: Another key difference between the two political systems lies in the extent to which the legislature is involved in determining the composition of the executive branch. In a parliamentary system, parliament plays a key role in determining the composition of a new administration (the cabinet). The prime minister heads the majority party in parliament, and the cabinet comprises of parliament leaders. In fact, the parliamentary system blurs the distinctions between the legislature and executive powers; it is often difficult to determine where the authority of one branch starts and that of the other ends. This fusion of power is not the case under the presidential system of government. Unlike senators and representatives, natural majorities elect presidents and the presidency derives its powers from a separate section of the Constitution. Although Congress does have some influence through the ratification of executive nominees.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The study has argued one of the most important themes in political science known as the institutions. While institutions are argued as the rules, procedures, policies, systems, laws and regulations that work in constraint, they are very valuable pillars of any successful state. From the institutions, then merge political institutions that gave birth to political systems. The study discussed and scrutinized parliamentary, presidential and hybrid (mixed) political systems across the world. From the surveyed of empirical literature, the study concludes that any political system can be chosen and implemented by the given state and government provided it is relevant to that particular environment and the people. Although institutions are critical to be established, their working is more critical too. Thus, institutions are supposed to deliver the desired services so that they are regarded as strong institutions. Overall, they must be run by strong individuals for them to be effective.

5. REFERENCES

Ackerman, B. 2013. *The Decline and Fall of the American Republic*. Belknap Press.
 Adebayo, A. 1989. *Towards a Dynamic African Economy*. Taylor and Francis

Almond, G. 2007. *Comparative Politics Today*. A World View. Pearson Publishers.
 Appadorai, P. 1968. The Importance of Cabinet Decision. *Journal of Governance*. Vol 2 4: 95-115
 Arguelles, L. 2009. *Proportional Representation in Non-Parliamentary System*. Good Books Publishers.
 Armand, P et al 2016. *History of the Political Institutions of the Nations of Europe and America*. Vol 1. Wentworth Press.
 Bagehot, W. 2010. The Concept of Parliamentarianism. *The American Historical Review*. Vol 61 2: 201-202
 Blondel, J. 1969. *The Role of Legislation in Institutional Strengthening*. Bloomberg Publishers.
 Bourdieu, P. 2000. *Institutions on Practice*. Peking University Press.
 Common, R. 2002. *The Concept of Political Institutions*. Basic Books.
 Davies, M. 1996. *Democracy and its Meaning*. Chicago University Press.
 Douglas. M. and Wildavsky, A. 2014. *Risks, Culture and Institutions*. University of California Press.
 Helmke, G. 2002. The Logic of Strategic Defection. *American Political Science Review*. Vol 96 2: 291-311
 Landman, T. 2018. *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics*. Routledge
 Lijphart, A. 2009. *Consociational Democracy*. Yale University Press.
 Linz, J and Stephen, A. 1996. Towards Consolidated Democracies. *Journal of Democracy*. Vol 7 2: 126-146
 Lipset, S. 1955. *Democracy and Economic Development*. Washington DC.
 Loewestern, J. 1965. *Importance of Institutions*. Zed Books.
 Nwabueze, B. 2004. *Constitutional Democracy in Africa*. Ibadan-Spectrum Books.
 Pierson, P. 2004. *Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis*. Princeton University Press.
 Powell, B. 1988. *Comparative Politics Today: A World View*. Brown College Division.
 Riak, J. 2023. *Introduction to Comparative Politics: Political Conundrums and Changing World*. Africa World Books Press. Perth-Australia.
 Riak, J. 2021. *South Sudan State Formation: Failures, Shocks and Hopes*. Africa World Books Press. Perth-Australia.
 Vondeth, N. 2005. *Foundation of Comparative Politics*. Cambridge University Press.
